Theft by Receiving—Possession—Drug Paraphernalia—Mandatory Joinder—Double Jeopardy—Prior Statements—Impeachment—Evidence.

The victim started her car and left it running while she went inside her home to retrieve some belongings. When she returned to where the car had been parked, the car was gone. She immediately reported the theft to the police. A few days later, a police officer pulled over the stolen car. Leverton and two women were passengers. Leverton told the officer that the car belonged to the victim, whom he claimed was his girlfriend. Leverton was arrested and transported to the police station. After removing Leverton from the police vehicle, the officer discovered a pipe typically used to smoke methamphetamine. Leverton was initially charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Shortly thereafter in a separate case he was charged with theft by receiving. The cases were later joined on the prosecution’s motion, over defendant’s objection. The women passengers testified at Leverton’s trial and were questioned by the prosecutor about oral statements they allegedly had made to police following their arrests. Leverton was convicted as charged.

            On appeal, Leverton argued that the trial court erred when it rejected his guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge and then permitted the prosecution to add that charge to the theft complaint because the result was that he was effectively charged with the same offense in two separate cases. He claimed that this violated Colorado’s mandatory joinder statute and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. The Court of Appeals noted that Leverton did not allege that he was reprosecuted for either offense after he was convicted or that he was sentenced or otherwise punished multiple times for those offenses. Here, the prosecution moved to join the two offenses prior to Leverton’s attempt to plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge. The court’s procedure met the purpose of the mandatory joinder statute, to prevent successive prosecutions, and Leverton raised no claim of unfair prejudice resulting from the procedure. Further, the court acted within its discretion when it rejected Leverton’s guilty plea to the petty offense. And because the court had not accepted Leverton’s guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge, double jeopardy had not attached and there was no due process violation.

Leverton next argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to examine the two women witnesses about their prior statements to the police, alleging this evidence was inadmissible and violated his confrontation rights. Both women testified that they did not remember what happened the night the stolen car was pulled over, nor did they remember any statements they made to the police. To impeach the witnesses, the prosecutor was entitled to confront them with the exact language of their prior inconsistent statements. Therefore, the court properly admitted the statements.

Leverton also argued that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed theft or possessed drug paraphernalia. A few days after the car had been reported stolen, the police found Leverton sitting in the car’s front passenger seat. Though Leverton told the police that the car had been given to him by the victim, his statement was directly refuted by the victim’s testimony that she had never met him. This and other evidence was sufficient to support the theft by receiving conviction. There was also sufficient evidence concerning the pipe found in the police vehicle for the jury to convict Leverton of possession of drug paraphernalia.

Leverton also argued that his convictions were based on his associations with other persons. Having found that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence proving that Leverton and not some other person committed the crimes, the Court rejected this argument.

The judgment was affirmed. 

Legal Malpractice—Burden of Proof—Collectability—Affirmative Defense.

Plaintiff Gallegos sued defendants LeHouillier, an attorney, and his law firm, LeHouillier & Associates, P.C. (collectively, LeHouillier), for legal malpractice. The jury found that LeHouillier had negligently breached his duty of professional care when handling an underlying medical malpractice case for Gallegos. The trial court placed the burden on Gallegos to prove that any judgment in the underlying case was collectable, and it ruled that Gallegos had provided sufficient evidence to prove that point, entering judgment in her favor.

On appeal, LeHouillier contended that the judgment must be reversed because collectibility is an element that a plaintiff must prove in a legal malpractice case, and Gallegos did not prove that any judgment that she would have received in the underlying malpractice case would have been collectible. Gallegos countered that the issue of collectibility is an affirmative defense and the court should have required LeHouillier to prove that the judgment was not collectible. The Court of Appeals determined that the record did not contain sufficient evidence that the judgment was collectible. In addition, the trial court erred when it placed the burden on Gallegos to prove that any judgment in the underlying medical malpractice case would have been collectible; it should have required LeHouillier (1) to raise the question of collectibility as an affirmative defense and (2) to prove that any judgment Gallegos would have received would not have been collectible.

The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

Private Property—Trespass—Injuries—Negligent Driving—Premises Liability Act.

Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was traveling through a private alley owned by defendants. Plaintiff’s vehicle collided with a Denver East Machinery Company (DEMC) truck driven by Freund. A police accident report determined that Freund was at fault and drove carelessly when rounding a corner of the DEMC building without looking or slowing down.

Plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and negligence per se. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the accident occurred on their private property, plaintiff could only assert claims under the Premises Liability Act (PLA). The trial court granted the motion but allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to assert a PLA claim, which plaintiff did. Defendants moved again for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion, determining that plaintiff was a trespasser, and because she did not allege a willful or deliberate injury, she was not entitled to relief.

On appeal, plaintiff contended that the PLA does not preclude her negligent driving claim and that the court erred in entering the initial summary judgment against her. The PLA limits the liability of landowners for injuries occurring on their property and preempts common law tort claims against landowners by specifying the duties owed to particular classes of injured plaintiffs. Such preempted claims include those for negligence per se against landowners for damages occurring on their premises. The collision arose from activities conducted on defendants’ property; thus the PLA controlled, and plaintiff was a trespasser who could only recover if she could demonstrate that defendants injured her willfully or deliberately. Plaintiff made no such allegations.

The judgment was affirmed.

Oil and Gas Conservation Act—Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission—Public Health and Safety.

Petitioners filed a petition for rulemaking pursuant to the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission’s Rule 529(b). Petitioners proposed a rule requesting that the Commission not issue permits for drilling oil and gas wells unless certain conditions were met to demonstrate that the drilling would not have specified adverse effects. The Commission ultimately denied the petition, concluding that (1) the proposed rule mandated action that exceeded the Commission’s statutory authority; (2) the requested third-party review contradicted the Commission’s nondelegable duty to promulgate rules; and (3) the public trust doctrine, which petitioners relied on to support their request, has been expressly rejected in Colorado. The district court affirmed the Commission’s order after concluding that the Commission rationally decided to deny the petition after considering input from stakeholders on both sides of the fracking issue in accordance with the Oil and Gas Conservation Act’s requirement of a balance between the development of oil and gas resources and the protection of public health, safety, and welfare.

On appeal, petitioners contended that the district court and the Commission erred in interpreting the Act. The Court of Appeals determined that the plain meaning of the statutory language indicates that fostering balanced development, production, and use of natural resources is in the public interest when that development is completed subject to the protection of public health, safety, and welfare. Therefore, the Commission erred in interpreting CRS § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) as requiring a balance between development and public health, safety, and welfare.

The district court’s and Commission’s orders were reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Dependency and Neglect—Indian Child Welfare Act—Notice—Burden of Proof.

In this dependency and neglect case concerning L.L., his mother, A.T., told the juvenile court at a shelter hearing that she had possible Apache Native American ancestry. Later, A.T. filed written information that included tribal card numbers and roll numbers. The Denver Department of Human Services (Department) did not send notice of the proceedings to any of the Apache Tribes. A.T. again stated that she had Indian heritage at a pretrial hearing, but the juvenile court did not address whether the Department used due diligence to identify and work with an Apache Tribe to verify whether L.L. is a member or is eligible for tribal membership. The court also did not treat L.L. as an Indian child pending verification from the tribe. Following a jury verdict, the court adjudicated L.L. dependent and neglected.

On appeal, A.T. contended that the order should be reversed because the Department did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notice requirements. First, when there is “reason to know” the child is an Indian child, the juvenile court must ensure that the Department sends notice to any identified Indian Tribe. Second, the court must “[t]reat the child as an Indian child, unless and until it is determined on the record that the child does not meet the definition of an ‘Indian child.’” Here, the Department did not meet its obligation to provide notice of the proceedings to any of the Apache Tribes. The juvenile court did not address whether the Department used due diligence to identify and work with an Apache Tribe to verify whether L.L. was a member or was eligible for membership and did not treat L.L. as an Indian child pending the Tribes’ verification.

A.T. also contended that the juvenile court violated ICWA by not requiring the jury to base its findings on a heightened clear and convincing evidentiary standard. There is no language in ICWA or associated rules or guidelines that indicates a heightened burden of proof for the adjudicatory hearing in a dependency and neglect proceeding. Thus, the state is only required to prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence in all adjudications, whether involving Indian or non-Indian children. The juvenile court did not err when it instructed the jury regarding the Department’s burden of proof.

The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.