After defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), officers impounded his vehicle because it was parked in front of a gas pump at a gas station. The officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a sealed box containing items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on those items, they obtained a warrant to search the vehicle and found additional items used to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search and warrant. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of DUI, careless driving, and possession of chemicals, supplies, or equipment with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have excluded evidence discovered in the inventory search of his vehicle and under the subsequently issued warrant. A vehicle is lawfully taken into custody if the seizure is authorized by law and department regulations and is reasonable. Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and are reasonable if (1) the vehicle was lawfully taken into custody; (2) the search was conducted according to “an established, standardized policy”; and (3) there is no showing that police acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Here, the decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable, and the inventory search was conducted according to standard policy and was constitutional. Because the inventory search was constitutional, evidence obtained under the subsequently issued warrant could not have been tainted.

Defendant next argued that the prosecutor improperly quantified the concept of reasonable doubt and lowered the burden of proof by using a puzzle analogy during closing argument. The prosecutor used a puzzle analogy to convey the difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond all doubt, which other courts have found permissible. Further, the prosecutor used the analogy to rebut the defense argument that evidence of defendant’s guilt was speculative. The Court of Appeals concluded there was no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s analogy contributed to defendant’s conviction. Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. Therefore, any impropriety in the prosecutor’s analogy was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lastly, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence that he intended to manufacture methamphetamine. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine.

The judgment was affirmed.

Jones was required to register as a sex offender. In 2011, he registered as a sex offender with the Aurora Police Department (Aurora P.D.) in Colorado. In August 2012, Jones was released from prison onto parole in an unrelated case, and he was given a voucher to stay at a particular motel in Aurora (and in Adams County). On August 12, 2012, Jones updated his sex offender registration with the Aurora P.D., listing the motel’s address as his new residence. On August 20, 2012, when the voucher expired, Jones left the motel and did not return. He did not report a change of address with the Aurora P.D. and did not register as a sex offender with any other local law enforcement agency in Adams County or in any other jurisdiction in Colorado until 2013. The People charged him with failure to register as a sex offender between August 26, 2012 and November 28, 2012.

At the close of evidence of his trial, Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that (1) the prosecution presented no evidence of where he resided during the relevant time period, and (2) ceasing to reside at an address and thereafter lacking a fixed residence does not fall within the meaning of “changing an address” under CRS 18-3-412.5(10(g). The trial court denied the motion, and Jones was convicted of the charge.

On appeal, Jones contended that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he failed to register “upon changing an address” under CRS § 18-3-412.5(1)(g). The Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (Act), CRS §§ 16-22-101 to -115, requires sex offenders to register with the local law enforcement agency where the person resides. CRS § 16-22-108(3)(i) criminalizes the failure to register upon “ceasing to reside at an address and [thereafter] lacking a fixed residence.” A violation of this section must be charged under the catchall provision in CRS § 18-3-412.5(1). Here, the prosecution elected to charge Jones only under CRS § 18-3-412.5(1)(g), which criminalizes the “[f]ailure to register with the local law enforcement agency in each jurisdiction in which the person resides upon changing an address, establishing an additional residence, or legally changing names.” Although Jones was required to register as a sex offender in each jurisdiction where he resided, there was no evidence that Jones had a fixed residence during any portion of the relevant time period. Because the evidence at trial did not establish a violation of CRS § 18-3-412.5(1)(g), he was wrongfully convicted under that statutory provision.

The judgment was vacated.

In 1995, Butler was convicted in Colorado and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment for sexually assaulting a child. In 1999, the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) placed Butler in a Minnesota prison, where he served the remainder of his Colorado sentence until he was released in 2006. A month after his release, Butler attempted to contact L.W., prompting L.W. to report abuse he had allegedly suffered as a child between January 1992 and May 1995. Charges were then brought against Butler in the present case based on L.W.’s allegations of sexual assault, and he was convicted. Butler filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion asserting that the charges were barred by the applicable 10-year statute of limitations. The postconviction court denied Butler’s motion based on tolling of Colorado’s limitations period while Butler was incarcerated and thus “absent from the state of Colorado.” Butler did not raise the statute of limitations argument on direct appeal.

The people initially contended that Butler was barred from pursuing his statute of limitations claim in a postconviction proceeding under the abuse of process rule. However, under an exception to the abuse of process rule, any claim that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be pursued in a postconviction proceeding. Consequently, Butler’s claim was not barred.

On appeal, Butler contended that the postconviction court erred in ruling that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of the statute of limitations’ tolling provision because he was absent from Colorado while he was incarcerated in Minnesota for his prior Colorado convictions. The Court of Appeals concluded that a defendant is “absent” from Colorado for statute of limitations purposes when he has been transferred by the DOC to an out-of-state facility to serve out the remainder of a Colorado sentence. Consequently, the applicable 10-year limitations period was tolled while Butler was in Minnesota. Additionally, under the circumstances here, the prosecution’s failure to plead Butler’s absence from the state did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed.

The order was affirmed.

Sodexo America, LLC (Sodexo) provides food services and food to the Colorado School of Mines (Mines) pursuant to a contract with Mines. Mines, in turn, contracts with its students to provide them food (the food obtained, prepared, and served by Sodexo) through various meal plans. The City of Golden (City) taxes Sodexo for students’ use of the meal plans. Sodexo collects and remits sales tax on campus food purchased with cash, check, or credit card. But the City also assesses Sodexo for sales tax on transactions whereby students swipe meal cards in exchange for meal plan meals, which taxation Sodexo challenged. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Sodexo’s challenges to the City’s assessment and denial of refunds.

On appeal, Sodexo contended that the City can’t tax it for meals purchased by Mines’ students under the students’ contracts with Mines. The Golden Municipal Code states that the City may levy sales tax on the purchase price of food, but exempts from taxation wholesale sales. Under the relevant contract and pursuant to the plain language of the Code, no sales occur between Sodexo and Mines’ students with meal plans; instead, Sodexo sells meal plan meals to Mines at wholesale. Because the Code expressly exempts wholesale sales from taxation, the City’s assessment is invalid.

The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment in Sodexo’s favor and for any other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Husband and wife executed a premarital agreement providing that husband would pay wife “during her lifetime” and wife would be entitled to receive from husband “during her lifetime” monthly payments on the filing of a petition for dissolution. In exchange for the monthly payments, wife waived maintenance. Husband and wife’s marriage ended in 1996, and husband consistently made monthly payments to wife under their separation agreement until his death. When husband’s estate refused to continue making the payments, wife filed the underlying action. The district court ruled that the premarital and separation agreements obligated the estate to continue making the monthly payments to wife until her death or remarriage. The court also awarded wife attorney fees and costs under the prevailing party provisions of the agreements.

On appeal, the estate contended that the district court erred in ruling that husband’s obligation under the premarital and separation agreements to make monthly payments to wife survived his death as an obligation of his estate. The premarital and separation agreements reflect agreement regarding the duration of the monthly payments relative to the life or marital status of the wife, but say nothing about what would happen on husband’s death. The separation agreement also released the parties and their estates from claims and demands. Therefore, husband’s personal obligation to pay ended when he died, absent a clear indication to the contrary, which neither the premarital nor separation agreement provided.

The estate also contended that the district court erroneously awarded wife attorney fees and costs and that it should have been awarded its own attorney fees under the prevailing party provisions of the agreements. The Court of Appeals agreed.

The order and judgments were reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

Stanley’s automobile insurer, Geico Indemnity Co. (Geico), entered into a “Release in Full of All Claims” (release) with the victim and her husband. Under the settlement, Geico paid the victim $25,000 for all claims related to and stemming from the accident in exchange for a full and final release of all claims against Stanley and Geico. Thereafter, Stanley pleaded guilty to felony vehicular assault, driving under the influence, and careless driving. The prosecution filed a motion to impose restitution and attached a report from the Crime Victim Compensation Program (CVCP). It showed that the CVCP had paid the victim $30,000, the maximum amount allowable by statute, for pecuniary losses proximately caused by Stanley’s criminal conduct. The Court awarded Stanley a $25,000 setoff against restitution for the amount paid by Geico, and ordered him to pay the $5,000 net amount.

On appeal, the prosecution argued that Stanley should not receive a setoff for the settlement funds because the release was an unapportioned settlement that did not “earmark” the proceeds for the same expenses compensated by the CVCP, leaving open the possibility that the victim used the proceeds for losses not compensated by the CVCP. When a victim receives compensation from a civil settlement against a defendant, the defendant may request a setoff against restitution “to the extent of any money actually paid to the victim for the same damages.” For purposes of a setoff, however, the court cannot allocate proceeds from an unapportioned civil settlement agreement without “specific evidence that the settlement included particular categories of loss,” because in civil cases victims may recover both pecuniary losses covered by the restitution statute and other damages specifically excluded under the restitution statute. Because the information needed to determine whether a victim has been fully compensated or has received a double recovery is known only by the victim, once a defendant has shown that a civil settlement includes the same categories of losses or expenses as compensated by the CVCP and awarded as restitution, the defendant has met his burden of going forward, and the prosecution may then rebut the inference that a double recovery has occurred. Here, Stanley met his burden of proving a setoff, but the victim may have used some or all of the settlement proceeds for losses not compensated by the CVCP.

The order was affirmed, and the case was remanded to permit the prosecution to show that the victim did not receive a double recovery from the settlement proceeds and the CVCP payment.