Implied Warranty of Suitability—Privity of Contract—Implied Warranties.

The Supreme Court considered whether privity of contract is necessary for a home buyer to assert a claim for breach of the implied warranty of suitability against a developer. The Court concluded that because breach of the implied warranty of suitability is a contract claim, privity of contract is required in such a case. Here, the home buyer was not in privity of contract with the developer and thus cannot pursue a claim against the developer for breach of the implied warranty of suitability. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Searches and Seizures—Warrantless Blood Draw— Consent to Search.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether a warrantless blood draw conducted on an unconscious driver pursuant to Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, CRS § 42-4-1301.1, violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches. The Court explained that by driving in Colorado, the driver consented to the terms of the statute, including its requirement that “[a]ny person who is dead or unconscious shall be tested to determine the alcohol or drug content of the person’s blood.” The Court concluded that the driver’s prior statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, the blood draw conducted in this case was constitutional. Consequently, the Court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the blood-draw evidence.

Searches and Seizures—Warrantless Blood Draw—Consent to Search.

Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, CRS § 42-4-1301.1, provides that any motorist who drives on the roads of the state has consented to take a blood or breath test when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer with probable cause to suspect the motorist of driving under the influence. In this interlocutory appeal, the Court reviewed the trial court’s ruling that an advisement accurately informing defendant of the statute amounted to coercion that rendered his consent to a blood test involuntary and required suppression of the test result. The Court explained that by driving in Colorado, defendant consented to the terms of the statute, including its requirement that he submit to a blood draw under the circumstances present in this case. The Court concluded that defendant’s prior statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, the blood test conducted in this case was constitutional. Consequently, the Court reversed the trial court’s suppression of the test result.

Searches and Seizures—Refusal to Submit to 12 Blood-Alcohol Testing—Admission of Refusal Evidence.

Constitutional Law—Personal Jurisdiction—General Jurisdiction—Corporations and Business Organizations.

The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause to review the trial court’s  conclusion that defendant Borrego Solar Systems, Inc. (Borrego) is subject to general  personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Because the trial court did not assess whether Borrego was essentially at home in Colorado, the Court concluded it did not fully apply the test announced in Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, 379 P.3d 1033, and therefore erred in exercising general personal jurisdiction over Borrego. Applying the complete test, the Court further concluded that Borrego is not subject to general jurisdiction in this state. The rule to show cause was made absolute and the case was remanded for further proceedings.