Criminal Law—Evidence Suppression.
This interlocutory appeal required the Supreme Court to determine whether a defendant’s confession to an Army investigator during basic training was the product of coercion. The Court held that, where a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, knew he was free to leave an interview, and confessed to committing a crime during the course of a conversational, friendly interview devoid of coercive promises or threats, he gave his statements voluntarily. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Life without Parole—Juveniles—Eighth Amendment—Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 35(b) and 35(c).

The Supreme Court considered whether Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on juvenile defendants convicted of multiple offenses. Graham holds that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the sentence of life without parole for a juvenile non-homicide offender. Miller bars mandatory life without parole for any juvenile offender. Because life without parole is a specific sentence imposed for a single offense, the Court held that Graham and Miller do not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed for multiple offenses. The Court thus held that Graham and Miller do not apply to Lucero’s aggregate term-of-years sentence. The Court also considered whether the Court of Appeals erred by treating Lucero’s Rule 35(b) motion for sentence reduction as a Rule 35(c) motion challenging the constitutionality of his sentence. Because a court may properly characterize a mischaracterized issue, and Lucero argued that his sentence must be reduced under Graham to meet constitutional standards, the Could held that the Court of Appeals did not err. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

Life without Parole—Juveniles—Eighth Amendment.

The Supreme Court considered whether Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on juvenile defendants convicted of multiple offenses. For reasons discussed at length in the lead companion case, Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, __ P.3d __, announced the same day, the Court held that Graham and Miller do not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed for multiple offenses. The Court therefore held that Graham and Miller do not apply to Rainer’s aggregate term-of-years sentence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed. 

 Life without parole—Juveniles—Eighth Amendment.

The Supreme Court considered whether Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on juvenile defendants convicted of multiple offenses. For reasons discussed at length in the lead companion case, Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, __ P.3d __, announced the same day, the Court held that Graham and Miller do not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed for multiple offenses. The Court therefore held that Graham and Miller do not apply to Armstrong’s aggregate term-of-years sentence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed.

Life without parole—Juveniles—Eighth Amendment.

The Supreme Court considered whether Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on juvenile defendants convicted of multiple offenses. For reasons discussed at length in the lead companion case, Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, __ P.3d __, announced the same day, the Court held that Graham and Miller do not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed for multiple offenses. The Court therefore held that Graham and Miller do not apply to Estrada-Huerta’s aggregate term-of-years sentence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed.

 Issue Preclusion—Attorney Disqualification—Colo. RPC 1.9.

In this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, the Supreme Court reviewed a district court’s order applying the doctrine of issue preclusion to deny defendants’ motion to disqualify one of the plaintiff’s attorneys under Colo. RPC 1.9 and to disqualify her law firm by imputation of the attorney’s conflict under Colo. RPC 1.10. The disqualification inquiry under Colo. RPC 1.9(a) asks whether an attorney’s prior representation and current representation are “substantially related.” This inquiry under Colo. RPC 1.9(a) is specific to the particular matter for which disqualification is sought. The supreme court therefore concludes that a motion to disqualify under Colo. RPC 1.9(a) will rarely, if ever, raise an “identical” issue to a disqualification motion in another case for purposes of issue preclusion. Here, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the doctrine of issue preclusion to deny the disqualification motion instead of conducting the requisite analysis under Colo. RPC 1.9(a). The Court therefore made the rule to show cause absolute, vacated the trial court’s order, and remanded the case for the trial court to address the merits of the motion to disqualify under Colo. RPC 1.9(a).

Governmental Immunity—Waiver of Governmental Immunity—Dangerous Condition.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act’s “recreation-area waiver,” which deprives a public entity of immunity in an action for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of a public facility located in a recreation area. Specifically, the Court examined the meaning of “dangerous condition” under the recreation-area waiver. The Court held that a non-negligently constructed and maintained piece of playground equipment cannot be a “dangerous condition” under the waiver. Given this holding, the facts respondents alleged cannot show that a “dangerous condition” existed in this case. The Court therefore concluded that the recreation-area waiver did not apply and petitioner retained its immunity from suit. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to reinstate the trial court’s order.