The Department of Corrections petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing an order of the district court that denied Fetzer’s petition pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(2). Fetzer’s petition sought an order compelling the recalculation of his parole eligibility date, asserting that the Department’s “governing sentence” method, which calculated his parole eligibility date solely on the basis of the longest of his concurrent sentences, violated the statutory requirement that his multiple sentences be treated as one continuous sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for recalculation, reasoning both that, contrary to the Department’s understanding, the statutory continuous sentence requirement applies to concurrent as well as consecutive sentences and that the Department’s “governing sentence” method of calculation could not apply to Fetzer’s sentences because they were all subject to the same statutory parole provisions.

The Supreme Court held that, because the “governing sentence” theories that have previously been sanctioned by this Court have served to determine the statutory parole and discharge provisions applicable to a single continuous sentence and the manner in which those provisions can be meaningfully applied to it, rather than as an alternative to the statutory continuous sentence requirement itself, the Department erred in simply substituting Fetzer’s longest sentence for the required continuous sentence. Because, however, Fetzer’s multiple sentences are not all subject to the same statutory parole provisions, as indicated in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reference to a governing sentence, or some comparable means of determining the applicable incidents of his parole, may remain necessary to the calculation of Fetzer’s parole eligibility date. The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court’s order was therefore affirmed. Its remand order, directing the Department to recalculate Fetzer’s parole eligibility date in accordance with its opinion, however, was reversed, and the case was remanded with directions that it be returned to the district court for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that where the Division of Unemployment Insurance determines a claimant was mentally unable to perform assigned work under CRS § 8-73-108(4)(j) of the Colorado Employment Security Act, CRS §§ 8-70-101 to 8-82-105, neither the text of CRS § 8-73-108(4)(j) nor related case law contemplates further inquiry into the cause of the claimant’s mental condition, and such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the simplified administrative proceedings to determine the claimant’s eligibility for benefits. Here, the Court concluded that the Division’s hearing officer erred in determining that claimant committed a volitional act to cause her mental incapacity and thus was at fault for her separation from employment and was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed.

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether respondent, a dog owner, owed a duty of care to petitioner, a child who became frightened when respondent’s dogs rushed at respondent’s front yard fence and who, although not touched by the fenced-in dogs, ran into the street and was struck and injured by a passing van. Because petitioner’s negligence claim against respondent was predicated on alleged nonfeasance, or failure to act, and because the case is distinguishable from cases in which a dangerous or vicious animal attacks and directly injures someone, petitioner was required to plead a special relationship between himself and respondent to establish the duty of care necessary to support his negligence claim. Petitioner did not, however, plead such a special relationship. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, as a matter of law, respondent owed no duty of care to petitioner and thus the district court properly dismissed petitioner’s negligence claim against respondent. The Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed.