Public Defender Representation—Statutory Interpretation.

In this case, the Supreme Court determined whether the Office of the State Public Defender has statutory authority to represent an indigent defendant in a civil forfeiture matter. Reviewing the plain language of the relevant statutes, the Court concluded that the Office of the State Public Defender was not statutorily authorized to enter its appearance in the underlying civil forfeiture matter.

Health Care Availability Act—Statutory Construction—Alternative Dispute Resolution.

CRS § 13-64-403 of the Health Care Availability Act governs arbitration agreements between patients and healthcare providers. Under CRS § 13-64-403(4), such agreements must contain a certain notice to patients to help ensure that they enter the agreements voluntarily, and the notice must be emphasized by at least 10-point font and bold-faced type. The agreement here contained the notice in 12-point font, but it was not bold-faced. The Court of Appeals determined the statute requires strict compliance and that the agreement therefore failed for lack of bold-faced type.

The Supreme Court held that CRS § 13-64-403 requires only substantial compliance. The Court further concluded the agreement here substantially complied with the formatting requirements of CRS § 13-64-403, notwithstanding its lack of bold-faced type. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Suppression of Statements—Two-Step Interrogation—Plurality Supreme Court Opinions—Miranda Warnings.

This case required the Supreme Court to decide (1) whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), created a precedential rule that could be applied to future cases, and (2) whether statements made by petitioner after she was given Miranda warnings should be suppressed because the statements were made after petitioner provided unwarned, incriminating statements to the police.

The Court concluded that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Seibert, which created an exception to the framework established in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), for cases involving a deliberate two-step interrogation aimed at undermining the efficiency of the Miranda warning, is the controlling precedent to be applied. Applying Justice Kennedy’s test here, the Court concluded that the officers in this case did not engage in a two-step interrogation in a deliberate attempt to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings provided to petitioner. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Elstad framework applies, and because petitioner’s pre- and post-warning statements were indisputably voluntary, the Court concluded that the division correctly determined that petitioner’s post-warning statements were admissible.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals division’s judgment.

Undisclosed Principals—Fraud—Breach of Fiduciary Duty—Restatement (Third) of Agency.

This case arose out of a sale of oil and gas assets by petitioners to a buyer who was acting as an agent for a third company. The third company was represented by respondents, but due to a prior, contentious business relationship between petitioners and the third company, neither the buyer, the third company, nor respondents disclosed to petitioners that the buyer was acting on behalf of the third company in the sale.

After the sale was complete, petitioners learned of the third company’s involvement and sued respondents, among others, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil conspiracy. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment for respondents, and a division of the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court here decided whether (1) petitioners could avoid their sale agreement for fraud when the buyer and respondents purportedly created the false impression that the buyer was not acting on behalf of the third company; (2) an assignment clause in the transaction documents sufficiently notified petitioners that the buyer was acting on behalf of others, such that the third company would not be considered an undisclosed principal under the Restatement provision on which petitioners’ contract avoidance argument is exclusively premised; (3) petitioners stated a viable claim for fraud against respondents; and (4) prior agreements between petitioners and the third company negated any joint venture relationship or fiduciary obligations between them.

The Court first concluded that the assignment clause in the pertinent transaction documents made clear that the buyer had partners in the transaction to whom it could assign a portion of its interests. As a result, the third company was not an undisclosed principal under the Restatement provision on which petitioners’ rely, and petitioners’ contract avoidance argument and the civil conspiracy claim that flows from it fail as a matter of law. The Court further concluded that, even if the Restatement provision did apply, the record did not support a finding that either the buyer or respondents created a false impression that the buyer was not acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal. For this reason as well, petitioners’ civil conspiracy claim failed as a matter of law.

The Court next concluded that, as a matter of law, petitioners did not demonstrate the requisite false representation or reasonable reliance to support a viable claim for fraud against respondents.

Finally, the Court concluded that the controlling agreements between petitioners and the third company expressly disavowed any pre-existing joint ventures and fiduciary obligations between the parties, and therefore the district court properly granted summary judgment for respondents on petitioners’ claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals division’s judgment.

Constitutional Law — Public Access to Court Records.

In this original proceeding, the Supreme Court considered and rejected a news organization’s contention that a trial court erred in refusing to grant public access to certain records maintained under seal in a capital murder case. The Court emphasized that, while presumptive access to judicial proceedings is a right recognized under both the state and federal constitutions, neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Colorado Supreme Court has ever held that records filed with a court are treated the same way. The Court thus declined the invitation to hold that unfettered access to criminal justice records is guaranteed by either the First Amendment or Article II, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution.