Defendant was involved in a fight at a party during which he struck the victim on the head with a hatchet. Defendant was found guilty of attempted second degree murder and first degree assault.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the State’s lead detective about blood patterns and tool markings without qualifying him as an expert. The detective’s reference to the blood evidence as “cast-off” required specialized knowledge that an ordinary person would not have, and he purported to rely on his training in blood pattern analysis. Therefore, the detective’s testimony was expert testimony and was improperly admitted. However, the error was harmless because it was undisputed that defendant struck the victim with the hatchet; the only dispute was whether he did so in self-defense, which the blood pattern on the door did not answer. The detective’s testimony that he looked at the marks on the apartment door to see if they matched the witnesses’ statements was similarly harmless because it did not help with proving or disproving self-defense.

Defendant next contended that multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct warranted reversal. A review of the record showed there was no error that would warrant reversal.

Defendant also argued that the trial court’s combined errors amounted to cumulative error. Based on the above conclusions, the cumulative effect of the asserted errors would not warrant reversal.  

The judgment was affirmed.

At age 17 defendant drove while intoxicated and crashed his vehicle, killing passengers B.B. and R.P. and seriously injuring a third passenger. Defendant pleaded guilty, as an adult, to two counts of vehicular homicide. Thereafter, defendant’s insurance company settled with the deceased victims’ families and the living victim. Each of the deceased victims’ families received $500,000 and, in exchange, released defendant, his parents, and his insurance company from all claims stemming from the incident. The court sentenced defendant, and the prosecution requested restitution. The court ordered defendant to pay restitution to R.P.’s family and to reimburse the Crime Victim Compensation Program (CVCP) for payments made to B.B.’s and R.P.’s families for funeral expenses. Defendant filed an objection to the order, and the court issued an amended order removing the payment to R.P.’s family.

On appeal, the People contended that the district court lacked authority to change its original restitution order. While the court’s authority to increase restitution previously ordered is limited, its authority to decrease restitution is not similarly limited. Therefore, the court had authority to decrease the restitution amount ordered when it finally determined that R.P.’s family was compensated by the settlement agreement.

Defendant contended that the court erred by denying him a setoff for the CVCP payments made to the victims’ families for funeral expenses because the agreements discharged his liability for these costs. The People contended that the district court erred by granting defendant a setoff for R.P.’s family’s travel expenses and psychologist fees based on the settlement agreement between defendant’s insurer and R.P.’s family. Here, defendant showed that the settlement agreement covered R.P.’s family’s travel expenses and psychologist fees, but the district court erred by not considering that the settlement agreements also covered the CVCP payments made to the victims’ families for funeral expenses.

The Court of Appeals rejected the People’s further arguments that (1) because the CVCP was not a party to and is not bound by the agreements, defendant is liable for the CVCP payments regardless of whether the agreements covered funeral costs; and (2) if defendant does not pay restitution, the agreements violate public policy because the statutory scheme favors ordering restitution.

The restitution order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs entered into a written contract with Miller and Interior Living Designs LLC (defendants) for floor covering materials. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for civil theft, for breach of contract, and to pierce the corporate veil, alleging that the materials were never fully delivered. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration (the motion). The magistrate denied the motion, purporting to act with the parties’ consent based on the lack of any objection to the magistrate’s previous order addressing delay reduction. Defendants moved for district court review, which the magistrate also denied.

Defendants appealed the magistrate’s ruling, arguing that the parties did not consent to the magistrate ruling on the motion. Here, because the magistrate’s delay reduction order did not inform the parties that they were required to consent to any particular function being performed by the magistrate, discussed only what the magistrate “may” do, and did not mention “consent,” it was insufficient under C.R.M. 5(g). Further, because the magistrate did not have the parties’ consent, and motions to dismiss are not listed in C.R.M. 6(c)(1) (No Consent Necessary), the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion under C.R.M. 6(c)(2).

The denial of the motion was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.