In 1996 Dewey was convicted of sexual assaulting and murdering J.T. After DNA testing revealed that defendant Thames’s DNA was present on objects found at the crime scene and under J.T.’s fingernails, Dewey was exonerated and released from prison. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder after deliberation, first degree felony murder, and first degree sexual assault of J.T. Defendant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. After sentencing, the trial court imposed a sex offender surcharge, a special advocate surcharge, a genetic testing surcharge, and court costs.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by not allowing him to introduce evidence of Dewey’s conviction. Here, the trial court allowed defendant to present other evidence that Dewey had sexually assaulted and murdered J.T. Further, pursuant to CRE 403, while evidence of Dewey’s conviction may have been relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury would be misled and defendant’s trial would be unduly delayed. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of Dewey’s conviction.

Defendant next contended that during closing argument, the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s silence during his interrogation in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Evidence about a defendant’s demeanor during questioning is admissible, and a jury may consider a witness’s demeanor for credibility purposes. Here, defendant was not silent during the interrogation. The prosecutor commented on defendant’s manner when answering officers’ questions during the interrogation, not on defendant’s failure to speak. Thus, the prosecutor’s comments were not impermissible.

Defendant further contended that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to view the video of his interrogation because it showed him wearing prison garb. He argued that this invited the jury to speculate about his criminal history and denied him of the presumption of innocence. The risk of prejudicing a defendant due to his clothing is not present when the jury is shown a video depicting the defendant in a prison uniform. In the video here, defendant is neither restrained nor handcuffed and is seated in what appears to be a conference room with pictures on the wall. Under these circumstances, defendant was not deprived of his innocence presumption.

Defendant next argued that the trial court erred in not allowing him to introduce evidence of Dewey’s DNA test results presented at Dewey’s trial, and such error deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a defense and to confront witnesses against him. The trial court’s decision not to admit Dewey’s DNA test results did not substantially influence the verdict or affect the fairness of the proceedings. Therefore, any error was harmless.

Defendant further contended that even if each of the above alleged errors does not separately require reversal, he was deprived of a fair trial due to the aggregate of errors. There was no error in the trial court’s decision to refuse to admit evidence of Dewey’s conviction, the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument, or the admission of the interrogation. Even assuming, without deciding, that the refusal to admit Dewey’s DNA results was error, a single error is insufficient to reverse under the cumulative error standard. Accordingly, there is no basis for reversal on grounds of cumulative error.

Lastly, defendant argued that the trial court violated his double jeopardy rights by imposing surcharges and costs (collectively, the Surcharges) outside his presence after sentencing. A court violates a defendant’s double jeopardy rights when it increases a lawful sentence after it has been imposed and the defendant has begun serving it, because the increased sentence could constitute multiple punishments for the same offense. However, an illegal sentence does not implicate double jeopardy because the sentencing court can correct it at any time. Here, the Surcharges are mandatory, but the trial court imposed them on defendant without giving him an opportunity to prove that he falls within one or more of the exemptions. Defendant’s original sentence was contrary to statute, and therefore illegal, because the trial court did not include the Surcharges in the sentence. Defendant’s double jeopardy rights were therefore not implicated through imposition of the Surcharges.

The judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded with instructions to provide defendant the opportunity to prove he is entitled to a waiver of one or more of the Surcharges.

Mother, father, and their child are citizens of Iran. The parents divorced in Iran in 2009, and custody of the child remained with mother pursuant to a court order. Mother moved to California in 2011. The child remained in Iran, where his maternal grandmother and father cared for him at different times between 2011 and 2015. The child joined mother in California in 2015, and mother and the child moved to Colorado in 2016. After mother suffered a mental health crisis and entered a mental health facility on an involuntary hold, the Adams County Department of Human Services (the Department) took the child into protective custody. The Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect, and the juvenile court later adjudicated the child dependent and neglected as to mother.

Father was in Iran at all times during the proceeding. The Department served father by publication and then moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights. The day before the scheduled termination hearing, father contacted the family’s caseworker and said he had just learned of the case and wanted the child returned to him. Father continued to telephone the caseworker over the next month. Nevertheless, the juvenile court entered a default adjudication as to father and terminated parental rights.

On appeal, mother contended that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because an Iranian child custody order was already in effect. Under the UCCJEA the foreign court that issued a child custody order retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination. Although a Colorado court may exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction to protect a child who is present in Colorado from mistreatment, abuse, or abandonment, a Colorado court exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction may not enter a permanent custody disposition. Here, the Iranian custody order was made under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA, and the only jurisdiction that the juvenile court could exercise was temporary emergency jurisdiction. Further, while the UCCJEA does not require enforcement of a foreign child custody order if the child custody law of the foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights, nothing about the child custody order in this case suggests such a violation. By entering permanent custody orders that terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights, the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction. The Department argued that the juvenile court’s lack of jurisdiction to enter permanent custody orders was harmless error because the United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran. However, the absence of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States does not alter the juvenile court’s duty to confer with the Iranian court that issued the custody order.

Father contended that the juvenile court erred in granting the Department’s motion to serve him by publication in Adams County knowing that he was in Iran.  Here, the evidence indicated that father was in Iran, but it did not establish whether the Department had made any efforts to locate father or to attempt personal service by any means that would likely result in father receiving actual notice. Thus, the juvenile court erred when it allowed the Department to serve father by publication. Further, the contacts between father and the Department after publication did not cure this deficiency.