The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing defendant’s convictions where the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s for-cause challenge to a juror under CRS § 16-10-103(1)(k), defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, and the challenged juror ultimately served on the jury. Consistent with the principle that the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause amounts to structural error if it results in an actually biased juror serving on the jury, the Court held that the erroneous seating of an impliedly biased juror is also structural error. In other words, for purposes of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury, a juror who is presumed by law to be biased is legally indistinguishable from an actually biased juror. 

In this case, the Title Board set a title for Proposed Ballot Initiative 2019–2020 #3 (Proposed Initiative) that reads, in pertinent part, “An amendment to the Colorado constitution concerning the repeal of the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR), Article X, Section 20 of the Colorado constitution.” The Board also ultimately adopted an abstract addressing the economic impact of the Proposed Initiative if passed.

The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether (1) the title is clear and not misleading; (2) the use of the phrase “Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights” in the title constitutes an impermissible catch phrase; and (3) the abstract is misleading. The Court concluded that the title and abstract are clear and not misleading, and that the phrase “Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights,” as used in this title, is not an impermissible catch phrase.

 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Title Board’s decision.

Consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises generally suffices to justify a warrantless search. But Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), carved out a narrow exception to this rule: Consent by one resident is insufficient when another resident is physically present and objects to the search.

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether the Randolph exception applies where the defendant’s wife provided police officers consent to enter the residence, and the defendant, though physically present, did not object until after the officers had already entered and were in the process of collecting drugs and paraphernalia. The Court concluded that the Randolph exception does not apply. The Randolph exception applies only if, at the time the officers receive an occupant’s consent, a co-occupant who is physically present on the premises objects. Accordingly, the officers were not required to heed defendant’s request to leave and did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The judgment was affirmed.