In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether (1) a witness’s credibility may be impeached based on her probationary status at the time she testifies, and (2) Margerum may be convicted of both assault and menacing based on the same conduct. The Court held that a witness’s probationary status is always relevant when the witness is on probation with the State and testifies for the prosecution. But because the trial court’s error in not allowing defense counsel to impeach a witness based on her probationary status was harmless under the facts here, reversal was not required. The Court further held that Margerum was properly convicted of assault and menacing because the facts support both convictions.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed

The Supreme Court considered whether, in a deferred judgment revocation proceeding based on a defendant’s failure to pay restitution, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the defendant has the ability to pay restitution. The Court held that when a defendant introduces some evidence of inability to pay restitution, a district court must make the ability-to-pay findings under CRS § 18-1.3-702(3)(c) before revoking a deferred judgment and sentence for failure to pay restitution. The Court further held that the prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) “the defendant has the ability to comply with the court’s order to pay a monetary amount due without undue hardship to the defendant or the defendant’s dependents,” and (2) “the defendant has not made a good-faith effort to comply with the order.” CRS § 18-1.3-702(3)(c).

The Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions to return this case to the district court for a new deferred judgment revocation hearing consistent with this opinion.

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a Court of Appeals division erred in concluding that a prosecutor’s race-based comments in her opening statement constituted reversible plain error. The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor’s comments on the contrasting skin tones of defendant and the victim were improper because any probative value that these comments might have had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant. The Court further concluded, however, that the prosecutor’s comments did not rise to the level of reversible plain error because even if obvious (an issue that the court need not decide), the error did not so undermine the fundamental fairness of defendant’s trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of his judgment of conviction.

Accordingly, the division’s judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Supreme Court considered whether the juvenile court may order a second competency evaluation in lieu of holding a restoration review pursuant to CRS § 19-2-1303(2) or a restoration hearing pursuant to CRS § 19-2-1304(1). The Court concluded that the juvenile court may not do so. Under CRS § 19-2-1305(1), the court may find that the juvenile has been restored to competency either during a restoration review or after holding a restoration hearing. Because the relevant statutes do not permit a juvenile court to order a second competency evaluation to determine whether a juvenile has been restored to competency, the district court erred in affirming the juvenile court’s order.

Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed the case was remanded with instructions to return the case to the juvenile court for a restoration review or a restoration hearing.

In this original proceeding brought pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying defendant’s request for a preliminary hearing without first determining whether the request was advanced within a reasonable time after the bonds in his cases were revoked and he was taken into custody. The relevant charges are class 4, 5, and 6 felonies that do not carry mandatory sentencing, are not crimes of violence pursuant to section CRS § 18-1.3-406, and are not sexual offenses. It is undisputed that while defendant was on bond, he was not eligible to receive a preliminary hearing on those charges. But the Court ruled that when his bonds were later revoked, he was entitled to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling. The case was remanded so that the district court may determine whether defendant’s demand was made within a reasonable time after he became eligible to advance it.

A jury found defendant guilty of sexual assault on a child. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury also found that defendant committed the offense as part of a pattern of abuse and that the People proved each of the listed incidents of sexual contact. However, in response to a unanimity interrogatory that the trial court failed to read aloud, the jury indicated that these same incidents of sexual contact were not proved. Defendant contended that his conviction amounts to structural error, requiring reversal under Sanchez v. People, 2014 CO 29, 325 P.3d 553.

The Supreme Court held that under People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, 416 P.3d 893, defendant did not waive his claim because he had no reason to be aware of the inconsistency of the jury’s responses. Next, turning to the merits of defendant’s claim, the Court held that Sanchez does not compel reversal because, unlike in that case, the jury here returned a guilty verdict reflecting its unanimous finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and any ambiguity in that verdict was resolved through individual polling of the jury.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed, albeit based on somewhat different reasoning.