The People petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment vacating Anderson’s conviction for attempted extreme indifference murder. The Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to support the conviction because it concluded that the universal malice element of extreme indifference murder requires that more than one person have been endangered by the defendant’s conduct, and no evidence was offered here to prove Anderson’s shooting endangered anyone other than the victim.

The Supreme Court held that the statutory definition of extreme indifference murder does not limit conviction of that offense to conduct endangering more than one person, and found the evidence in this case was sufficient to permit a jury determination of Anderson’s guilt of attempted extreme indifference murder. The Court of Appeals’ judgment vacating Anderson’s conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of any assignments of error concerning that conviction not yet addressed.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether evidence of defendant’s alleged assault of a police officer should be suppressed based on police misconduct. The police entered defendant’s property in violation of the Fourth Amendment and defendant responded by allegedly assaulting and attempting to disarm a police officer. The Court held that the evidence of defendant’s alleged criminal acts should not be suppressed because the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct. Defendant’s choice to physically resist broke the causal connection between the evidence and the police misconduct, so the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule was not satisfied and the rule does not apply. The trial court’s suppression order was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the impact of the legalization of small amounts of marijuana for adults who are at least 21 years old on law enforcement’s use of drug-detection dogs that alert to marijuana when conducting an exploratory sniff of an item or area. The Court held that a sniff from a drug-detection dog that is trained to alert to marijuana constitutes a search under the Colorado Constitution because that sniff can detect lawful activity, namely the legal possession of up to one ounce of marijuana by adults 21 and older. The Court further held that, in Colorado, law enforcement officers must have probable cause to believe that an item or area contains a drug in violation of state law before deploying a drug-detection dog that alerts to marijuana for an exploratory sniff.

The Court concluded that there was no probable cause in this case to justify the sniff of McKnight’s truck by a drug-detection dog trained to alert to marijuana, and thus, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court further concluded that the appropriate remedy for this violation of the Colorado Constitution is the exclusion of the evidence at issue. Thus, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse McKnight’s judgment of conviction.

At issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether law enforcement needed probable cause before deploying a drug-detection dog that was trained to alert to both marijuana and other substances. Adopting the analytical framework announced in the companion case, People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, __ P.3d __, the Supreme Court held that the officers needed probable cause before deploying such a drug-detection dog, and Gadberry’s statements regarding the presence or non-presence of marijuana did not change this. Because the officers did not have probable cause, the drug-detection dog should not have been deployed. Accordingly, the trial court’s suppression order was affirmed.

In this sales tax dispute, the Supreme Court considered whether a food service vendor to a university sold meals directly to students with meal plans at retail, or whether the vendor sold those meals to the university at wholesale. If the meal-plan meals were sold at retail to the students, they would be taxable under the relevant municipal ordinances; if the meals were sold at wholesale to the university, they would be exempt from taxation. After examining the plain language of the ordinances, the Court held that the food service vendor sold the meal-plan meals to the university at wholesale, and thus the transactions were tax-exempt. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.