In this opinion, the Supreme Court considered whether the elements of robbery and theft from a person are inconsistent, such that a defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes. The Court further considered whether, in the case of mutually exclusive guilty verdicts, the proper remedy is a new trial.

The Court held that when an essential element of one crime negates an essential element of another crime, guilty verdicts for those two offenses are mutually exclusive, and the defendant cannot be convicted of both. Here, the jury convicted defendant of robbery and theft from a person. Robbery is the unlawful taking of an item with force, while theft from a person is the unlawful taking of an item without force. Because an element of robbery, with force, and an element of theft from a person, without force, negate one another, defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes.

The Court concluded that the obvious inconsistency between the elements of robbery and theft from a person renders the error plain. Because it is impossible to determine what the jury decided, whether the defendant acted with or without force, the Court further concluded that the proper remedy is a new trial. Thus, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to grant a new trial.

The Supreme Court considered whether CRS § 18-1.3-102(1), as it read between 2002 and 2012, prevents a trial court from extending a deferred judgment within the maximum statutory period of four years for reasons unrelated to the payment of restitution. Because the Court determined that the statute is ambiguous, the plain meaning rule is not dispositive. Instead, the Court resorted to other interpretive rules. Relying on the statutory history, the purpose behind the enactment of the statute, and the consequences of the parties’ differing constructions, the Court held that CRS § 18-1.3-102(1) does not prohibit a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, from extending a defendant’s deferred judgment for any legitimate reason and as many times as it deems appropriate, so long as the aggregate period of the deferral does not exceed four years. The Court further held that when a defendant has been on a deferred judgment for four years, the statute empowers the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to extend the deferred judgment for a period not to exceed 180 days, so long as the payment of restitution is the only condition of supervision not yet fulfilled. The Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed.