This case required the Supreme Court to decide a number of issues relating to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a dependency and neglect proceeding.

The Court first concluded that in a direct appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, an appellate court may consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s performance at an adjudicatory hearing only when the party claiming ineffective assistance did not have a full and fair opportunity to assert such a claim immediately after his or her child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Next, the Court concluded that the proper test for prejudice in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and neglect proceeding is the test for prejudice set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Accordingly, to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance in a dependency and neglect proceeding, a party must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Lastly, the Court concluded that an appellate court may vacate a juvenile court’s decision in a dependency and neglect proceeding on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel without remanding for further fact-finding when either (1) the record is sufficiently developed to allow the appellate court to decide the question of counsel’s ineffectiveness, or (2) the record establishes presumptive prejudice under the standard set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656–62 (1984).

Applying these determinations to the facts and claims before it, the Court concluded that respondent mother (1) had a full and fair opportunity to appeal the adjudication entered after the adjudicatory hearing and thus cannot now raise her claim that her counsel was ineffective at that hearing; (2) has not established a basis for presuming prejudice in this case and has not shown that her counsel was ineffective in allowing the Pueblo County Department of Human Services to proceed by way of an offer of proof at the termination hearing; and (3) has established that her counsel was ineffective in not properly litigating the issue of less drastic alternatives to termination and therefore a remand for further proceedings is warranted and appropriate.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the division below, albeit on different grounds, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case is a companion case to People in the Interest of A.R., 2020 CO 10, __ P.3d __, decided the same day. For the reasons discussed at length in A.R., the Court concluded that the proper test for prejudice in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and neglect proceeding is the test for prejudice set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), and not a fundamental fairness test. Accordingly, to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance in a dependency and neglect proceeding, a party must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Court further concluded that an appellate court may vacate a juvenile court’s decision in a dependency and neglect proceeding on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel without remanding for further fact-finding when either (1) the record is sufficiently developed to allow the appellate court to decide the question of counsel’s ineffectiveness, or (2) the record establishes presumptive prejudice under the standard set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656–62 (1984).

Applying these principles here, the Court concluded that the juvenile court correctly applied Strickland’s prejudice prong to father’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting those claims.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment terminating father’s parental rights.

Juarez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. With regard to his challenge to the effectiveness of his counsel, the district court found both that defense counsel adequately advised his client concerning the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty to misdemeanor drug possession and that, in any event, there was no reasonable probability Juarez would not have taken the plea. The intermediate appellate court similarly found that counsel’s advice fell within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, but as a result of that finding, the appellate court considered it unnecessary to address whether counsel’s performance prejudiced Juarez.

The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that because Juarez conceded he was advised and understood that the misdemeanor offense to which he pleaded guilty would make him “deportable,” defense counsel’s advice concerning the immigration consequences of his plea correctly informed him of the controlling law and therefore did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required for effective assistance concerning immigration advice.

In the lawsuit underlying this original proceeding, a complainant filed an action in district court under CRCP 106(a)(4) seeking an order compelling the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) to investigate the complainant’s allegations of attorney misconduct. After OARC moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it sought relief under C.A.R. 21. The Court has long held that as part of its inherent powers, it has exclusive authority to regulate and supervise the practice of law in Colorado, including the structure and administration of attorney discipline proceedings. The Court’s rules governing attorney discipline proceedings do not contemplate district court review of OARC intake decisions. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review OARC’s decision not to proceed with an investigation into allegations of attorney misconduct. The Court therefore made the rule to show cause absolute.