First Degree Arson—Criminal Mischief—Lesser Included Offense—Res Gestae Evidence—Impeachment—CRE 608(b)—Witness Disclosure.

Welborne and his mother set fire to the house in which they lived and filed false insurance claims based on the fire. Welborne was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison for arson, six years for criminal mischief, six years for attempted theft, and eight years for theft—all to be served concurrently.

On appeal, Welborne contended that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his earlier insurance claims to the same company. The prior false insurance claims involved the same company, related to a material fact, and were logically relevant to the charges. Evidence of Welborne’s false but fruitful insurance claims was highly probative of whether he acted to deceive the same insurance company with the intent to permanently deprive it of money. The trial court instructed the jury on the limited purposes of the evidence. The evidence was properly admitted under CRE 404(b) and as res gestae evidence.

Welborne further contended that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to impeach him with his California theft conviction. The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of Welborne’s prior theft offense under Rule 608(b) as probative of truthfulness or dishonesty. Although the prosecutor presented evidence of the conviction rather than the underlying facts, any error was harmless.

Welborne also argued that the trial court erred by barring him from calling a witness to impeach the testimony of his former girlfriend. Disclosure of this witness was not timely, and Welborne’s offer of proof did not show that the testimony was admissible or that the witness would impeach the girlfriend’s testimony that Welborne had started the fire.

Finally, Welborne contended that criminal mischief is an included offense of first degree arson and, therefore, those convictions must merge. Because criminal mischief requires proof that the acts were committed in a single criminal episode, while first degree arson does not, criminal mischief is not an included offense of first degree arson.

The judgment was affirmed.

Forgery—Urinalysis Results—Attempt to Influence a Public Servant—Probation—Res Gestae Evidence—Prosecutorial Misconduct.

Carian was on probation for possession of a controlled substance, and mandatory drug tests were a condition of his probation. Carian completed some tests, but missed others and also returned tests with positive results. When Carian’s probation officer served him with a revocation complaint for various probation violations, Carian handed her fraudulent urine drug test results from Wiz Quiz, an unapproved urinalysis facility. Carian was convicted of forgery and attempting to influence a public servant.

On appeal, Carian contended that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of forgery under CRS § 18-5-102(1)(d) because the urinalysis results at issue were not a “public record” or “an instrument filed or required by law to be filed or legally fileable in or with a public office or public servant.” While the urinalysis results from Wiz Quiz were “instrument[s]” within the reach of the statute, they were not filed, required by law to be filed, or legally fileable, thus the evidence did not support his forgery conviction.

Carian also contended that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence under the doctrine of res gestae showing that he had been previously convicted of a drug offense. Regardless of whether the admission of such evidence was error, it did not substantially influence the verdict or affect the fairness of the proceedings regarding his conviction for attempting to influence a public servant. Thus, any error in its admission was harmless.

Carian further contended that the prosecutor committed misconduct, during both his opening statement and his rebuttal closing, by asking the jury to hold Carian accountable for wasting public resources and “squandering” the opportunity to rehabilitate himself on probation. Although the prosecutor’s statements were improper, the admission of such statements does not warrant reversal under either plain or harmless error review.

Garrison had an affair with the victim’s wife. After the affair ended, Garrison and his wife set up through Google a Gmail account in the victim’s name. Using that account, they sent themselves derogatory and threatening emails. Based on these emails, Garrison and his wife made police reports against the victim and provided related documents to the police. They sought a protection order against the victim and testified about the emails at the hearing. The police filed charges against the victim. When it was later determined that Garrison and his wife had set up the Gmail account, charges against the victim were dismissed, and the Garrisons were charged. At trial police officers gave testimony about Internet Protocol (IP). Garrison was convicted of first degree perjury, attempt to influence a public servant (three counts), conspiracy to attempt to influence a public servant, possessing a defaced firearm, and felony menacing. 

On appeal, Garrison first contended that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a continuance of the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying him a continuance, and Garrison was not prejudiced because, as discussed below, he is entitled to a new trial on his convictions related to the IP address testimony.

Garrison also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to present expert testimony regarding tracing IP addresses through the lay testimony of police officers. Where an officer’s testimony is based not only on his perceptions and observations of the crime scene but also on specialized knowledge or experience, the officer must be properly qualified as an expert. The concept of an email transmission including an IP address, which can be linked to an Internet service provider (ISP), and in turn traced to the physical location of a particular ISP customer, is not within the knowledge or experience of ordinary people. Thus, because some of the police testimony on direct examination was based on particular experience and specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this portion of the testimony as lay testimony. The error was not harmless because this information was central to the prosecution’s case on the charges of first degree perjury, attempt to influence a public servant (three counts), and conspiracy to attempt to influence a public servant. The charges of possessing a defaced firearm and felony menacing were unrelated to IP addresses.

The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Using an alias, Allman presented himself to the victim as a businessman who had recently moved from Washington to Colorado. Allman moved into the victim’s basement, gained her trust, and when the victim left on vacation, Allman accessed the victim’s bank accounts and stole money from them. Allman also opened several credit cards in the victim’s name, moved out of her home, took her car, and obtained over $40,000 of credit in her name. Allman was convicted of eight counts of identity theft, two counts of forgery, one count of aggravated motor vehicle theft, and one count of theft from an at-risk adult. He was sentenced consecutively for some counts and concurrently for others.

Following remand, the district court denied the Kleins’ request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to a line of credit agreement (LOC) between them and Tiburon Development LLC (Tiburon). The district court granted Tiburon’s and Sell’s (a member of Tiburon) motions for attorney fees and costs.

“Legal Disability” for Tolling Statute of Limitations—CRS § 13-80-103.7(3.5)(a).

T.D.’s complaint alleged she had endured 10 years of sexual and physical abuse from defendant, her former stepfather. She alleged that she was 7 years old when the abuse began and that it continued until about 1990, when she was in high school. She alleged that the abuse caused her to become dependent on drugs and alcohol, and she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, psychological disorders, self-mutilation, eating disorders, depression, and a cycle of abusive relationships.

            In August 2005, T.D. disclosed defendant’s alleged abuse to the doctors who had been treating her. She attempted suicide in 2012. Thereafter she was able to maintain sobriety. T.D. filed a lawsuit in 2015 asserting assault, battery, sexual assault and battery, extreme and outrageous conduct, and false imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that T.D.’s claims had accrued in 2005 when she disclosed the alleged abuse to her doctors. Consequently, her claims were time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations in CRS § 13-80-103.7(1). T.D. argued that the record contained genuine issues of material fact concerning whether she had been a “person under disability” until 2012 because of her addictions and psychiatric disorder, so the statute would have been tolled until her disability was lifted. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact in the record about when her claims accrued or whether the statute of limitations barred those claims.

            The Court of Appeals determined that the issue of when the claim accrued was not properly before it, and assumed it accrued at the latest in 2005. The Court then considered whether there was a factual dispute about whether the applicable statute of limitations was tolled because T.D. was a “person under disability.” Under CRS 13-80-103.75(3.5)(a), a “person under disability” is a person who is (1) a minor under 18 (2) “declared mentally incompetent”; (3) “under other legal disability and who does not have a legal guardian”; or (4) “in a special relationship with the perpetrator of the assault” and “psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault or offense and the resulting harm.” T.D. was 43 when the trial court granted the summary judgment motion, so she was not a minor from 2005 to 2011, when the statute of limitations was running. The record did not contain disputed facts about whether she was mentally incompetent during the years during which the statute of limitations ran. The Court concluded that “legal disability” denotes an inability to bring a lawsuit based on a “policy of the law.” No facts in the record indicated that T.D. lacked the power to timely bring her suit. Lastly, while a familial relationship can constitute a “special relationship,” T.D. did not demonstrate that she was “psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault or offense and the resulting harm.”

            The judgment was affirmed.

A certified class of Colorado oil and gas royalty owners (the Class) and EnCana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc. (EnCana) litigated, beginning in 2005, EnCana’s alleged underpayment of royalties on natural gas it produced. In 2008, EnCana and the Class entered into a settlement agreement that detailed payment of funds to settle past claims, established the methodology EnCana would use for future royalty payments, and included an arbitration clause. The district court’s final judgment approved and incorporated the settlement agreement, dismissed the 2005 case with prejudice, and reserved jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. In 2016, oil and gas royalty owners (Owners), purporting to act on behalf of the Class, filed a demand for arbitration alleging EnCana had underpaid royalties owed to Class members in violation of the settlement agreement. EnCana filed a new case in district court asserting that (1) the class ceased to exist when the 2005 case was dismissed with prejudice in 2008, and (2) the 2008 settlement agreement did not authorize arbitration on a class-wide basis. The district court found that the class had not ceased to exist and the claims should be resolved in class-wide arbitration, and entered summary judgment against EnCana. On appeal, EnCana contended that the district court erred in finding that the Class continued after the case was dismissed. The Court of Appeals determined that the Class survived the 2008 dismissal because (1) compliance with the settlement agreement became part of the dismissal order, so the district court retains jurisdiction to give effect to the agreement; and (2) the agreement continues for the lives of the leases or royalty agreements covered by the settlement agreement and expressly burdens and benefits successors and assigns of the parties.