Disciplinary charges were filed against Ruybalid IV during his tenure as District Attorney for the Third Judicial District, located in Las Animas and Huerfano Counties (Counties). The Counties refused to assume Ruybalid’s defense and he hired private counsel to represent him. Ruybalid eventually admitted to violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. After resolving the disciplinary action, Ruybalid filed a complaint for declaratory relief for his attorney fees and other costs incurred in the disciplinary proceeding. The district court concluded that Ruybalid stated neither a statutory nor an equitable claim for relief, and it dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, Ruybalid’s primary contention was that he is statutorily entitled to attorney fees and costs under CRS § 20-1-303 and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. CRS § 20-1-303 states that a district attorney “shall be allowed to collect and receive from each of the counties in his district the expenses necessarily incurred in the discharge of his official duties for the benefit of such county.” Because the statute does not explicitly authorize awarding parties to a legal proceeding attorney fees and costs, it does not create an exception to the long-established presumption that parties pay their own way. Ruybalid also argued that he should be reimbursed as a matter of public policy. The Court of Appeals did not consider the merits of this argument, concluding that matters of public policy are better addressed by the General Assembly. The Court also observed that Ruybalid’s complaint did not state a plausible claim for relief; it simply parroted the statutory language, asserting a legal conclusion without supporting factual allegations.

Ruybalid also contended that the district court erred in dismissing his promissory estoppel claim. However, the allegations in the complaint failed to state a promissory estoppel claim.

The judgment was affirmed.

The trial court ordered Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) to establish a conservatorship account for the benefit of Kylee Becker (the beneficiary) to be maintained by her father, Aaron Becker (Becker). It was intended to be a restricted account for the beneficiary’s settlement funds obtained as a result of a personal injury claim. In its order, the court stated that no funds could be withdrawn from the account except by “separate certified order of this court.” Wells Fargo complied with the order and deposited funds into the account, but allowed Becker to make unauthorized transfers from the account until it had a negative balance. The trial court issued a show cause order to Wells Fargo and Becker related to the removal of funds without a court order. After a hearing, the trial court found Becker and Wells Fargo jointly and severally liable for breach of fiduciary duty, and ordered Wells Fargo to restore the funds to the account. Wells Fargo moved to reconsider the order to restore funds, arguing that the trial court should have considered the percentage of fault attributable to it and Becker as required by CRS § 13-21-111.5. Wells Fargo requested that the trial court determine the relative degrees of liability between it and Becker regarding mismanagement of the account, and determine the amount of the depleted funds actually spent for the beneficiary’s benefit, to not afford her a double recovery. The trial court denied the motion based on its power to supervise fiduciary administration of estates under CRS §§ 15-10-501 to -505.

On appeal, Wells Fargo contended that the trial court erred when, in denying the motion for reconsideration, it did not apportion liability between Wells Fargo and Becker. Based on a plain reading of the statutes and their interpretation in appellate decisions, the trial court correctly determined that CRS § 13-21-111.5 does not apply in this case. Title 13 was intended to contemplate limitations on damages only for actions brought as a result of negligence or another tort.

Wells Fargo also contended that the trial court erred by ordering it to restore the full amount to the restricted account because, based on the evidence produced at trial, Becker withdrew some of those funds to pay for food, schooling, and other necessities for the beneficiary. The trial court was required to make findings regarding the amount of funds actually used for the beneficiary and failed to do so.

The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded to the trial court for further factual findings, and based on those findings, entry of an order regarding the amount of Wells Fargo’s liability, if any.