This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance that defense counsel requested seeking more time to prepare for trial. At the time the continuance was requested, the trial court considered the following factors: (1) defense counsel would have three weeks to prepare for a two- or three-day trial involving eight witnesses and no physical evidence, but defense counsel refused to make specific arguments on why the additional time was needed; (2) the trial court would have had to rearrange its docket and possibly hand off the case to a different judge; (3) priority is given to cases involving the sexual assault of a child; and (4) the victim’s family wanted to resolve the case promptly.

The Supreme Court concluded that, under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to deny a continuance was not so manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair to constitute an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals’ opinion crediting defendant for a confinement period after a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict on an unrelated  charge. Under CRS § 18-1.3-405, credit is to be given only where the presentence confinement is caused by the charge on which the defendant is being sentenced. Considering Massey v. People, 736 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1987), and People v. Freeman, 735 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1987), the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to presentence confinement credit for her confinement before or after the not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

The Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming a trial court’s order requiring a pair of litigants to pay a court-appointed accounting expert’s post-settlement collection costs. The trial court appointed the expert to help resolve the litigants’ complex accounting claims, and the litigants signed an engagement agreement with the expert setting forth the scope of his services and payment. After the expert commenced work, the litigants settled the case and the trial court dismissed the suit. The expert then informed the trial court that the litigants refused to pay both his outstanding fees and his costs incurred post-settlement in attempting to collect the outstanding fees. Relying on a provision in the engagement agreement stating that the litigants were responsible for payment of “all fees and expenses” to the expert, the trial court held that the expert was entitled to the post-settlement costs he incurred while trying to collect his outstanding fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the engagement agreement, holding that the agreement was silent as to the expert’s post-settlement collection costs, but it nevertheless affirmed the trial court’s award of the expert’s post-settlement collection costs on the ground that the trial court had inherent authority to require the litigants to pay such costs. The Court held that a separate provision of the engagement agreement not previously considered by the trial court or the Court of Appeals authorized the trial court’s award of the disputed post-settlement collection costs. The Court therefore affirmed the award of these costs to the expert, albeit on different grounds.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether an amendment to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) providing that expert testimony “shall be limited to matters disclosed in detail in the [expert] report” mandates the exclusion of expert testimony as a sanction when the underlying report fails to meet the requirements of Rule 26. The Court concluded this amendment did not create mandatory exclusion of expert testimony and that instead, the harm and proportionality analysis under Rule 37(c) remains the proper framework for determining sanctions for discovery violations. Accordingly, the Court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether the district court had the authority to continue to collect unpaid restitution, court costs, and fees ordered as conditions of petitioner’s deferred sentence after the completion of that deferred sentence. The Court concluded that the district court may collect any unpaid restitution from petitioner after the completion of her deferred sentence, until the restitution has been paid in full. With respect to the unpaid fees and costs, however, the Court concluded that the district court lacked the authority to collect such unpaid amounts after it terminated petitioner’s deferred sentence, withdrew her guilty plea, and dismissed her case with prejudice. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s orders in part and reversed in part.

This case required the Supreme Court to determine when the right of contribution provided in 26 USC § 6672(d) (2012) gives rise to a “claim” under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Applying the “conduct test,” under which a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes at the time the debtor committed the conduct on which the claim is based, the Court concluded that petitioner’s claim for contribution arose when the parties’ jointly owned company incurred federal tax withholding liability, rendering the parties potentially responsible for that debt. Because this conduct occurred before respondents filed their bankruptcy petition, the Court concluded that petitioner’s claim constituted a pre-petition debt that was subject to discharge. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.