April 10, 2017
2017 CO 20. No. 12SC143. Mosley v. People.
Criminal Trials—Speedy Trial—Continuances.
The Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals’ construction of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, CRS § 18-1-405. The Court rejected Mosley’s contention that the exclusions of time listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply only to the speedy trial calculation for an initial trial, and not for a new trial following reversal of a conviction on appeal under subsection (2). The Court concluded that subsection (1) of the statute establishes the basic right to a speedy trial, and that subsection (2) clarifies that right by identifying the trial court’s receipt of the mandate as the event that triggers the six-month speedy trial period for a new trial following reversal of a conviction on appeal. Because a defendant’s speedy trial right—whether in an initial trial or on retrial—derives from subsection (1), the exclusions of time listed in subsection (6) apply to both an initial trial and a new trial following reversal of a conviction on appeal. The Court further rejected Mosley’s contention that the trial court erred in granting a continuance and extending the speedy trial deadline in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
2017 CO 21. No. 13SC961. Delacruz v. People.
Criminal Trials—Speedy Trial—Continuances.
The Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals’ construction of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, CRS § 18-1-405. Following Mosley v. People, 2017 15 CO 20, ___ P.3d ___, the Court rejected Delacruz’s contention that the exclusions of time listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply only to the speedy trial calculation for an initial trial, and not for a new trial following reversal of a conviction on appeal. The Court concluded that subsection (1) of the statute establishes the basic right to a speedy trial, and that subsection (2) clarifies that right by identifying the trial court’s receipt of the mandate as the event that triggers the six-month speedy trial period for a new trial following reversal of a conviction on appeal. Because a defendant’s speedy trial right—whether in an initial trial or on retrial—derives from subsection (1), the exclusions of time listed in subsection (6) apply to both an initial trial and a new trial following reversal of a conviction on appeal. The Court further rejected Delacruz’s contention that the trial court erred in granting a continuance and extending the speedy trial deadline in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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2017 CO 22. No. 15SC816. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v. McClure.
Limited Liability Companies—Membership Interests—Charging Orders—Priority.
This case concerns the relative priority of competing charging orders filed by multiple judgment creditors against a foreign judgment debtor’s membership interests in several Colorado limited liability companies (LLCs). The Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of determining the enforceability of a charging order, a membership interest of a non-Colorado citizen in a Colorado LLC is located in Colorado, where the LLC was formed. The Court further concluded that when, as here, a judgment creditor obtains a foreign charging order that compels certain action by a Colorado LLC, the charging order is ineffective as against the LLC until the creditor has taken sufficient steps to obligate the company to comply with that order. Although the authorities are not uniform as to the steps to be taken, under any of the applicable scenarios, the charging orders obtained by the petitioner did not become effective until after the respondents had obtained and served their competing charging orders. Accordingly, the Court concluded that respondents’ charging orders are entitled to priority over petitioner’s competing charging orders and therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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