2018 CO 16. No. 14SC190. Ybanez v. People. Post-Conviction Proceedings—Criminal Trials—Sentencing. 
Ybanez petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction of first degree murder and directing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole be modified only to the extent of permitting the possibility of parole after 40 years. See People v. Ybanez, No. 11CA0434 (Colo.App. Feb. 13, 2014). In an appeal of his conviction and sentence, combined with an appeal of the partial denial of his motion for postconviction relief, the intermediate appellate court rejected Ybanez’s assertions that (1) the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both because his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a non-waivable conflict of interest under which that counsel labored and because he was prejudiced by a deficient performance by his counsel; and (3) he was entitled to an individualized determination regarding the length of his sentence rather than merely the possibility of parole after 40 years. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that (1) Ybanez lacked any constitutional right to a guardian ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing one as permitted by statute; (2) Ybanez failed to demonstrate either an adverse effect resulting from an actual conflict of interest, even if his counsel actually labored under a conflict, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, even if it actually fell below the required standard of competent representation; and (3) Ybanez is constitutionally and statutorily entitled only to an individualized determination whether life without the possibility of parole or life with the possibility of parole after 40 years is the appropriate sentence. The case was remanded with directions to return it to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Public Employment—Education. 
In this case, the Supreme Court considered two certified questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: (1) whether the unpaid-leave  provisions of CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5) apply to all non-probationary teachers who are not employed in a “mutual consent” placement, or only to those who are displaced for the reasons enumerated in CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(VII); and (2) whether a non-probationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV) is deprived of a state property interest in salary and benefits. The Court held that the provisions of CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5) apply to all displaced non-probationary teachers, not just non-probationary teachers who are displaced because of a reason stated in CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(VII). The Court further held that non-probationary teachers who are placed on unpaid leave have no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a non-probationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV) is not deprived of a state property interest.

Public Employment—Education. 
In this case, the Supreme Court considered (1) whether the General Assembly, by enacting the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), created a legislative contract that it later impaired by enacting the unpaid-leave provisions of CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5); and (2) whether a non-probationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under CRS § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV) is deprived of due process. The Court held that TECDA did not create a legislative contract or vest non-probationary teachers who are placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. The Court therefore concluded that the General Assembly has not impaired a contractual obligation by enacting the unpaid-leave provisions and that non-probationary teachers who are placed on unpaid leave have not suffered a violation of their right to due process.