Colorado Court of Appeals Opinions

November 15, 2018

11/15/18

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2018 COA 157. Nos. 15CA0342 & 15CA0531. People in re Interest of A.C.E-D.

Following a complaint of shoplifting, police officers contacted A.C.E-D. He confessed, led them to the merchandise, and was charged with misdemeanor theft. In a separate case, A.C.E-D. was charged with misdemeanor harassment based on Facebook messages sent to his ex-girlfriend. In both cases, A.C.E-D. pleaded guilty. Before sentencing, he moved to determine competency and later moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court ordered a competency evaluation, found A.C.E-D. competent, allowed A.C.E-D. to withdraw his guilty pleas, and conducted a bench trial. The court found A.C.E-D. guilty of the charges and adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent.

On appeal, A.C.E-D. argued that the previous iteration of the competency statute for juveniles, CRS § 19-2-1301(2), was facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied because it incorporated the definition of “incompetent to proceed” for adults in criminal proceedings set out in CRS § 16-8.5-101(11), which did not allow the court to consider A.C.E-D.’s age and maturity. A juvenile adjudication need only be fundamentally fair, and using the same competency test for both juveniles and adults is fundamentally fair. Because A.C.E-D. failed to show that under no set of circumstances would the statute be constitutional, the trial court’s finding that the statute was not facially invalid was proper.

A.C.E-D. also argued that that statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because the trial court’s application precluded him from being declared incompetent since he didn’t prove he had a mental or developmental disability. Sufficient evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding of competency under Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), and thus A.C.E-D. did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court unconstitutionally applied the statute to him.

A.C.E-D. also argued that the trial court erred in admitting Facebook messages because the prosecution did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he wrote and sent the Facebook messages. The prosecution met the heightened standard for Facebook messages, and A.C.E-D’s contrary evidence goes to the weight of the messages. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the messages.

The adjudications were affirmed.
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2018 COA 158. No. 16CA0444. People v. Ray.

A jury convicted defendant of second-degree assault. The trial court sentenced him to prison and ordered him to pay $19,855.91 in restitution. In accordance with the restitution statute in effect at the time, the restitution order in this case specifically noted that interest would accrue at 12% per annum from the date of order’s entry. Defendant later received a letter from the district court clerk, which stated that he had an outstanding restitution balance of $19,583.98 and that “interest will be added at 1% per month of the current balance . . . until the original restitution amount is paid in full.” Defendant contested the monthly interest charge, which was denied by the trial court.

On appeal, defendant contended that the phrase “per annum” in the restitution statute is unambiguous and means that interest can only be collected once a year. He argued the district court erred by allowing the clerk to charge monthly interest on the outstanding restitution amount. However, the term per annum is not defined in the statute and is thus ambiguous. Based on legislative intent, case law from other jurisdictions, and standard methods of calculating interest, the Court of Appeals determined that the statute does not limit the payment of interest to an annual basis. Therefore, the Judicial Department did not violate the statute.

The order was affirmed.

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2018 COA 159. No. 16CA1105. People v. Jacobs.

A jury convicted defendant of distribution and conspiracy to distribute a schedule II controlled substance. The trial court subsequently found that defendant had been convicted in 2007 of distributing a controlled substance. Based on this finding, it enhanced the distribution of a controlled substance conviction from a class 3 felony to a class 2 felony and found defendant was a habitual criminal. The court then sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison for the distribution count. Applying the habitual criminal finding, the court increased the sentence on this count to 96 years in prison. On the conspiracy count, the court sentenced defendant to 12 years in prison for that class 3 felony. Again applying the habitual criminal finding, the court increased the sentence on this count to 48 years in prison, to be served concurrently with the sentence on the distribution count.

On appeal, defendant argued that the 2007 conviction did not fit the statutory definition of a conviction that the trial court could use to enhance the distribution count from a class 3 felony to a class 2 felony. Here, the mittimus and amended mittimus in the 2007 case contain a mistake: they state that defendant pleaded guilty to a class 3 felony charge, but documents in the record from the 2007 case clearly show that defendant pleaded guilty to a class 4 felony. Pursuant to CRS § 18-18-405(2)(a), a trial court may only increase the level of a class 3 distribution of a schedule II controlled substance felony based on an equal or more severe felony. Therefore, the trial court erred when it relied on defendant’s prior conviction to enhance his class 3 distribution felony to a class 2 felony.

Defendant also argued that one of the habitual criminal counts, which was based on the 2007 conviction, suffered from the same statutory defect. But any error involving the 2007 conviction was harmless because vacating one of defendant’s five habitual criminal counts would have no effect on his sentence, which only requires three prior felony convictions.

Defendant further contended that his convictions and sentences on both the distribution and conspiracy counts based on the same quantum of drugs violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The prosecution conceded this contention, noting that, even under plain error review, the trial court obviously and substantially violated defendant’s right to avoid double jeopardy.

The enhancement of defendant’s class 3 felony distribution conviction and prison sentence for that conviction were reversed. The conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute a schedule II controlled substance were also reversed, and the case was remanded with directions.
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2018 COA 160. No. 16CA2083. Cielo Vista Ranch I, LLC v. Alire.

Fifteen years ago, the Colorado Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court with instructions to “identify all landowners who have access rights to the Taylor Ranch.” In 2004, the district court began identifying and decreeing access rights for landowners in the San Luis Valley whose land was settled by 1869. From 2004 until 2010, the district court relied on the best available evidence to decree access rights for individual landowners without requiring any landowner to come forward to assert a claim (the opt-out process). After 2010, the district court decreed access rights for only those landowners who came forward to assert claims (the opt-in process). In October 2016, the trial court issued a final order that certified all prior orders, adjudicating 26 access rights for landowners as final and appealable pursuant to CRCP 54(b). Remaining landowner claimants were not foreclosed from coming forward in the future.

Appellants in this case are CVR Properties, Ltd., Jaroso Creek Ranch, LLC, and Western Properties Investors LLC, the owners of Cielo Vista Ranch and other properties that were once known as the Taylor Ranch (the Ranch) (collectively, Ranch Owner). Appellees are landowners in Costilla County whose rights to access the Ranch to graze livestock and gather firewood and timber were decreed through the remand proceedings.

On appeal, Ranch Owner challenged the trial court’s implementation of the Supreme Court’s mandate on remand. The opt-out proceedings on remand from 2004 through 2010 were largely consistent with the mandate. But as to the opt-in process from 2010 through 2016, the district court did not completely discharge the mandate because that portion of the identification process could have been, but was not, comprehensive. The trial court mistakenly concluded that it was bound by the law of the case doctrine to implement an opt-in process during the last phase on remand.

The October 2016 order was reversed to the extent it requires any remaining landowners entitled to access to the Ranch to come forward. The case was remanded for the trial court to identify all remaining owners of benefited lands and adjudicate their rights. In all other respects the order was affirmed.
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2018 COA 161. No. 17CA1065. Estate of Cloos.

The decedent devised her entire estate to her daughter, Jean Ann. Because the will devised the entire estate to Jean Ann, Jean Ann’s father, Cloos (who was the decedent’s husband), made statutory claims for shares of the estate. He claimed a $32,000 family allowance (FA) and a $32,000 exempt property allowance (EPA). He also petitioned for a supplemental elective share of the marital property. Jean Ann was the original personal representative (PR), but the court later appointed Findley as successor PR due to mutual distrust between Jean Ann and Cloos. Findley approved the sale of the marital home to Cloos to be paid with credits for his FA and EPA claims and gave Cloos a credit of $50,000 from probate estate funds for his “statutory minimum elective-share,” as well as 48,500 cash, which was the only asset in the estate. The district court granted a final settlement of the estate.

On appeal, Jean Ann contended that the district court erred by allocating $50,000 in elective-share funds from the probate estate to Cloos. A surviving spouse married for 10 years or more is statutorily entitled to an elective share of marital assets equal to (1) 50% of the augmented estate (standard elective share), or (2) $50,000 (supplemental elective share), whichever is greater. In satisfying the $50,000 amount, the surviving spouse’s own title-based ownership interests count first; for this purpose, the survivor’s assets include amounts transferred to the survivor at the decedent’s death and amounts owing to the survivor from the decedent’s estate under the elective share formula.

In this case, Cloos’s share of marital assets in real estate interests alone far exceeded $50,000 because he owned half of the Fort Collins house (appraised at $325,000) and all of the Wyoming cabin (assessed at $277,000). Therefore, Cloos is not entitled to a supplemental elective share of the estate, and it was error to credit him with a supplemental $50,000 of probate estate funds toward his purchase of the Fort Collins house. However, the record does not contain a calculation of the augmented estate at the time of the decedent’s death. While it appears from the limited information in the record that Cloos held well over 50% of the augmented estate and was thus not entitled to any further assets from the probate estate, there is no evidence in the record that the successor PR calculated either the actual value of the augmented estate or the percentage held by Cloos. It is thus unclear whether Cloos was entitled to any standard elective-share credit toward the house.

The order approving the final settlement of the estate was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

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2018 COA 162. No. 17CA1171. Nanez v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office.

            While working as a plumber, Nanez sustained permanent disabling closed-head injuries, causing significant cognitive deficits. His authorized treating physician (ATP) placed him at maximum medical improvement with a permanent impairment rating of 47% of the whole person. His employer admitted liability. As a result of his cognitive impairments, Nanez’s ATP recommended that both a conservator and guardian be appointed to function as Nanez’s “peripheral brain.” Both were appointed, and Nanez requested his employer pay for them pursuant to CRS § 8-42-101(1)(a). He also asked that his average weekly wage (AWW) be increased to cover his lost potential earning capacity. Both requests were denied by an ALJ, and the denial was affirmed by a panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel).

            On appeal, Nanez contended that his employer should be liable to pay for the guardian and conservator. He contended that their services are medical benefits because they relieve the effects of his brain injury. The Court of Appeals found support for the ALJ’s findings that the conservator’s services handling Nanez’s finances didn’t cure or relieve him of the injury’s effects, and Nanez failed to establish that the guardian’s duties in managing his treatment and ongoing care were reasonable and necessary. The Court concluded that the conservator’s and guardian’s services were not medical treatment as that term is used in CRS § 8-42-101(1)(a) and therefore the employer was not liable to pay for them.  

            Nanez also contended that the Panel erred in affirming the ALJ’s denial of the AWW increase. The ALJ’s decision declining the increased AWW because Nanez’s potential future wages are too speculative is supported by substantial record evidence, and the Panel properly affirmed it.

The order was affirmed.

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2018 COA 163. No. 17CA2090. People in the Interest of M.V.

The El Paso County Department of Human Services (the Department) initiated a dependency and neglect case regarding mother’s children. The case was based on methamphetamine use, manufacture, and distribution, and domestic violence. Following a jury trial, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected. After another hearing, the court entered a dispositional order that adopted a treatment plan for mother.

            On appeal, mother argued that the record did not demonstrate compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and therefore the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the children and enter a dispositional order. The Court of Appeals first concluded that the juvenile court’s asserted lack of compliance with ICWA’s notice provisions do not divest it of subject matter jurisdiction to enter the adjudicatory and dispositional orders. The ICWA allows Indian children, parents, and tribes to challenge a termination judgment, but this does not take away the jurisdiction of the state court. Here, the asserted lack of compliance with ICWA’s notice provisions did not divest the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to enter the adjudicatory and dispositional orders.

            The Court also determined that the ICWA’s foster care placement provisions apply to a dispositional order, but not to an order adjudicating a child dependent and neglected. In this case, based on mother’s ICWA assessment form, there was reason for the court to know that the children were Indian children. The record contains no indication that the Department gave the required notices or that the juvenile court made the necessary findings. The record fails to demonstrate compliance with the ICWA.

Mother also argued that the juvenile court committed reversible error by admitting video recordings of her and the children that had been anonymously provided to the Department and were not properly authenticated. Here, the Department did not establish either the accuracy of the scenes depicted in the videos or the accuracy of the recording process. Thus, the juvenile court erred in admitting the video recordings. Further, the Court could not conclude that the admission of the videos did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the error was not harmless.

The adjudicatory and dispositional orders were reversed and the case was remanded for a new adjudicatory trial.

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2018 COA 164. No. 17CA2370. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning W.F-L.

Father and mother have a child together but were never married. A Georgia court entered a final order in 2011 and a modified parenting plan in 2012 concerning the child. In 2014, mother and the child relocated to Colorado. In 2016, father petitioned to register the 2012 parenting plan in Colorado under CRS § 14-13-305. Mother responded that both the parenting plan and the 2011 final order needed to be registered in Colorado and co-petitioned to register both orders.
Father then filed a verified motion under CRS § 14-10-129.5 alleging that mother was not permitting him to exercise his parenting time or to contact the child. Mother opposed and moved to modify parenting time. At the final orders hearing, the district court entered an order registering the Georgia orders in Colorado and adopting the parties’ stipulations for future parenting time. It found that it lacked jurisdiction to grant father the enforcement remedies he sought and denied his CRS § 14-10-129.5 motion. 
The Court of Appeals first rejected mother’s argument that father’s appeal of the denial of his enforcement motion was moot because the district court adopted the parties’ stipulations to modify the Georgia parenting time order. Father’s requests were not mooted by the modification order, as they remain undecided and could have been ordered in addition to modification.
Father argued that the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and therefore denying his CRS § 14-10-129.5 motion. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) governs a Colorado court’s enforcement of parental responsibilities orders entered in other states. Under CRS § 14-13-305(1), a parental responsibilities determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in Colorado and a Colorado court may then “grant any relief normally available under” Colorado law to enforce the registered parental responsibilities determination. On registering the Georgia orders, father was entitled to seek the same remedies as if those orders had been entered in Colorado, including CRS § 14-10-129.5’s backward-looking remedies, and the district court was empowered to grant any enforcement relief normally available under Colorado law as to those orders. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying father’s motion. 
The order was reversed and the case was remanded for the district court to address father’s CRS § 14-10-129.5 motion.

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2018 COA 165. No. 518CA0313. People in the Interest of C.N.

In 2015, the Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and Families filed a petition in dependency and neglect due to concerns about mother’s mental health. Mother’s newborn was placed in foster care and mother’s parental rights were terminated a year later. A division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and a mandate was issued in February 2017. That same month, grandmother filed a motion to intervene in the case and then filed a motion for the child to be placed with her. The juvenile court held a contested hearing on the motion and found it was in the child’s best interest to permanently remain with the foster parents. The court also terminated grandmother’s visitation with the child. The child was adopted by the foster parents in January 2018.

            On appeal, grandmother argued that mother did not receive reasonable accommodations to address her mental health issues and the child had a fundamental right of association with grandmother. Also, she asserted that as an intervenor in the case she was a real party interest as to these issues. The Court construed grandmother’s arguments to be that she had standing in the case. Grandmother cited no substantive law granting her standing to assert the rights of mother and the child. Further, courts have consistently held that in dependency and neglect appeals parents and intervenors lack standing to assert the rights of other parties. Grandmother lacked standing to raise the issues on appeal regarding mother and the child.

            Grandmother also argued the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the child never resided or was present in Jefferson County. The allegation that the child was dependent or neglected conferred subject matter jurisdiction with the juvenile court; the question then turned on whether venue was proper. When mother gave birth to the child, she was asked at the hospital where she lived and she provided an address in Arvada, which is within Jefferson County. Thus, venue was proper.

            Grandmother further argued that her fundamental associational rights with the child required that she be fully considered for placement of the child and it was error for her not to receive notice of the termination hearing. Grandmother did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the society or custody of the child because she had only limited visitation rights derived from statute and had no existing custodial relationship. Grandmother did not have placement of the child and was not entitled to notice of the termination hearing.

            The Court also rejected grandmother’s argument that it was error to not allow grandmother to file a petition for the adoption of the child in the dependency and neglect case. There is no such right in the dependency and neglect proceeding, and grandmother was not precluded from timely filing an adoption petition in a separate proceeding. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in disallowing the filing of the adoption petition.

            The Court further rejected grandmother’s argument that the juvenile court erred in terminating her visitation rights with the child. Grandmother’s visitation rights were terminated at the time mother’s parental rights were terminated.

            The judgment was affirmed.

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