Defendant was arrested for domestic violence crimes. Officers later discovered that defendant had provided a false name and date of birth during the arrest. Defendant was charged with felony menacing, criminal impersonation, violation of bail bond conditions, and violation of a protection order. Defendant moved to suppress his statement to the officer about his name, and the trial court denied the motion. At trial, the prosecution relied on defendant’s statement to support the charges of criminal impersonation and false reporting to authorities. In a bifurcated hearing, a jury found defendant guilty of criminal impersonation and the lesser nonincluded offense of false reporting to authorities. Defendant later pleaded guilty to a single count of violating a protection order in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement giving a false name because it had been obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When an individual is interrogated in violation of Miranda, and the response to the questioning is itself a criminal act, Miranda’s exclusionary rule does not bar admission of the statement at a subsequent trial involving charges based on the criminal act. Here, even assuming the question was asked in violation of Miranda, the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress because defendant’s false statement about his identity constituted a new crime.

Defendant next contended that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by denying his motions for a mistrial after evidence of his prior bad acts was admitted. Under CRE 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or bad acts is generally inadmissible to prove the character of a person to show that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Here, the victim testified that defendant was “[j]ust pushing me around, yelling at me like he always did” and referenced defendant’s “other pending cases.” An ambiguous reference to a defendant’s prior criminal misconduct or other bad acts does not warrant a mistrial. Further, based on properly admitted evidence, the jury was aware that defendant had engaged in prior misconduct with respect to the victim. Moreover, with respect to both statements, the reference to improper conduct was fleeting, so potential prejudice was minimized. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motions for a mistrial.

The judgment was affirmed.

Sharon suffered multiple ailments during his stay at the Belmont Lodge Health Care Center (Belmont Lodge) nursing facility. He sued SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co. (doing business as Belmont Lodge) and its affiliates SavaSeniorCare Consulting, LLC (Consulting) and SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC (Administrative Services) for negligence. A jury ruled in Sharon’s favor and awarded him noneconomic and punitive damages.

Defendants appealed, and Sharon died during that appeal. A Court of Appeals’ division concluded that a joint venture did not exist between defendants and that Administrative Services didn’t owe an independent duty of care to Sharon. Because it wasn’t able to determine from the jury’s verdict if the jury had found any particular defendant independently negligent, the division reversed the entire judgment and ordered a retrial of Sharon’s negligence claim against only Belmont Lodge and Consulting. On remand, Belmont Lodge and Consulting moved for summary judgment and for a determination of a question of law, arguing that under Colorado’s survival statute, the representatives could not recover noneconomic or punitive damages, which were the only damages Sharon had sought. After plaintiffs stipulated that they sought only noneconomic and punitive damages, the court entered judgment for Belmont Lodge and Consulting.

On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred by applying the survival statute. Colorado’s survival statute provides that a person’s claims against another (except those for slander or libel) survive that person’s death. However, a representative can recover damages for economic losses, but not noneconomic damages. Likewise, when a person recovers noneconomic damages in a personal injury action but then dies while the appeal is pending, and the judgment is reversed on appeal, those noneconomic damages are not recoverable by the estate or representative in a new trial because the prior recovery has been nullified and the survival statute bars recovery of such damages by or on behalf of a deceased plaintiff. Sharon’s negligence claim survived his death, but the damages his representatives sought are not recoverable.

The order was affirmed.

Wife petitioned the court to modify her dissolution of marriage decree by allocating husband’s previously undisclosed business assets. Ruling without the parties’ consent, a district court magistrate granted wife’s petition and ordered husband to pay wife half of the value of the assets in monthly installments. Husband petitioned for district court review of the magistrate’s order. Less than a week after husband filed the petition, wife recorded a summary of the magistrate’s order (the Abstract) with the Douglas County Clerk and Recorder. After discovering the Abstract months later, husband petitioned the district court to invalidate the Abstract as a “spurious lien” or “spurious document.” The trial court denied the petition.

On appeal, husband argued that the district court erred in finding that the Abstract was not a spurious lien because in a non-consent case, the underlying magistrate’s order is merely an unenforceable recommendation and not a lien. Magistrates have the authority to modify permanent orders in dissolution of marriage proceedings without the parties’ consent, and the magistrate’s order was enforceable when entered, even though husband timely appealed it. The magistrate was authorized to act on behalf of the district court when she entered the order, and her order is an order of the district court. Thus, any lien imposed by the magistrate’s order could not have been spurious. Finally, unlike a typical money judgment, the magistrate’s order created an equitable lien to secure husband’s payment obligation to wife, so wife did not require a transcript of judgment or other separate document to create a lien against husband’s property.

Husband also argued that the district court erred in finding that the Abstract was not a spurious document. The Abstract accurately summarizes the language of an enforceable court order and thus is not a spurious document.

The order was affirmed. The case was remanded to the district court for findings on the amount of reasonable attorney fees and other costs awardable to wife and wife’s attorney.