Spiremedia Inc. filed a complaint against Wozniak for breach of contract and treble damages for a dishonored check. Four days after filing, the district court issued a delay reduction order (DRO) stating that failure to comply with the DRO could result in case dismissal. Wozniak failed to respond to the complaint after he was served, and Spiremedia filed a motion for default judgment under CRCP 55. The district court denied the motion for noncompliance with CRCP 121, § 1-14, but did not explain how the motion was deficient. Two days later Spiremedia refiled the motion for default judgment with an affidavit stating Wozniak was not a minor, incompetent, or a service member. The district court found the second motion “substantially identical” to the first and denied it without explanation. The district court stated that plaintiff violated the DRO by twice filing the motion in improper format and dismissed the case. Spiremedia filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, which the district court denied. 

On appeal, as an initial matter, the Court of Appeals determined it had jurisdiction because the dismissal order did not state that the case was dismissed with prejudice and the statute of limitations had run. Further, the notice of appeal was timely filed.

            Spiromedia asserted its second motion for default judgment complied with CRCP 121, § 1-14, and thus the district court erred by denying it. Here, Spiremedia’s attorney fees request was deficient because it did not set forth the matters required by Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 and it was unsupported by an affidavit of counsel. The district court did not err by concluding that the motions were deficient. However, a court must provide an explanation of how a motion for default judgment is deficient such that a party can identify and attempt to correct the deficiencies before the case is dismissed. Here, the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the motions failed to meet the requirements of Rule 121, § 1-14 and did not afford it the opportunity to correct those deficiencies. It thus erred by dismissing the case.

            The judgment of dismissal was reversed. The complaint was reinstated and the case was remanded with instructions.

Defendant was found guilty of second degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, second degree kidnapping with a deadly weapon, sexual assault of an at-risk victim, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and third degree assault of an at-risk victim.

On appeal, defendant asserted that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he was guilty of kidnapping. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant sexually assaulted the victim after he pulled a knife from the knife block in the kitchen, pointed the knife at her, and forcefully moved her down the stairs into a basement bedroom, where he pushed her onto a bed and sexually assaulted her. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping.

Defendant also contended that during voir dire the trial court erred by making comments that trivialized the prosecution’s burden of proof and his presumption of innocence. Here, the judge compared reasonable doubt to doing “important things” such as buying a home or choosing doctors. The trial court’s description of the reasonable doubt standard trivialized the prosecution’s burden of proof by comparing the decision jurors make in a criminal case to decisions they make in their everyday lives. Because the trial court’s error impermissibly lowered the burden of proof, the error was structural and requires reversal.

Defendant further argued that the jury instruction on second degree kidnapping was improper. The instruction failed to track the applicable statutory language because it did not state that to convict defendant of kidnapping with a deadly weapon, the kidnapping had to be “accomplished by” the use of a deadly weapon.

Defendant also contended that the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (the Act) is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals found no reason to depart from the decisions of other divisions that consistently upheld the constitutionality of the Act.

The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and careless driving. At a post-trial hearing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had three prior convictions for driving while ability impaired (DWAI) or DUI. Based on that finding, the court elevated defendant’s misdemeanor DUI conviction to a class 4 felony and sentenced him accordingly.

On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by convicting him of a class 4 felony based on its own finding that he had three prior convictions for DUI or DWAI. Prior convictions required to convict a person of felony DUI are elements of the offense and must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Claimant worked as a service technician for Pella Windows & Doors, Inc. (Pella). He was laid off but later entered into a Master Service Subcontract Agreement to work for Pella as an independent contractor. Claimant took numerous steps to establish himself as an independent contractor, including forming and registering his own business. While on a work assignment for Pella, claimant fell from a second story window and suffered a compression fracture of his spine and now suffers from paraplegia. Despite telling doctors and others that he was a self-employed independent contractor, several months after his injury claimant filed a claim for workers’ compensation. Pella and its insurer contested on the grounds that claimant was an independent contractor at the time of his injury.

            An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the nine statutory factors that establish an independent contractor’s independence from a prospective employer, enumerated in the Workers’ Compensation Act, all weighed in Pella’s favor. The ALJ thus found that claimant was an independent contractor. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel) set aside the ALJ’s order because she failed to follow Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Softrock Geological Services, Inc., 2014 CO 30, which expanded the independent contractor analysis beyond the nine statutory factors. On remand, the ALJ analyzed the case under Softrock and entered an order in November 2015 concluding again that claimant was an independent contractor. The Panel found the ALJ’s conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence in the record and again rejected her reasoning. In a second remand, another ALJ reversed the prior ALJ’s order and awarded claimant benefits. Pella sought further review and the Panel upheld the award.

            On appeal, Pella contended that the Panel erred by applying Softrock. The Panel did not err when it determined the ALJ should have considered the Softrock factors in weighing whether claimant’s business was independent of Pella, and the Panel correctly remanded the matter to the ALJ for consideration of the Softrock factors. But once an ALJ has weighed the statutory and Softrock factors, the ALJ’s findings and determinations regarding independent contractor status cannot be set aside if substantial evidence supports them. Here, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s factual findings and credibility determinations. The Panel therefore should not have set aside the November 2015 order.

            The Panel’s orders were set aside and the case was remanded with directions to reinstate the ALJ’s November 2015 order.