The district court entered a property division award, ordered husband to pay maintenance, and entered an attorney fees sanction against husband in the parties’ dissolution of marriage.

On appeal, husband contended that the property division was inequitable. Here, there was conflicting and imprecise evidence regarding values for the personal property, so the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was equitable for each party to retain his or her property. Further, the court properly omitted the Jamaica home that was wife’s premarital property where there was no evidence regarding any increase in value and thus no marital value for the court to divide. There was also no abuse of discretion in the unequal but equitable division of debts divided in proportion to the parties’ incomes. Finally, the court did not err in dividing the husband’s 401(k) equally between the parties, given their economic circumstances.

Husband also contended that the district court abused its discretion by awarding wife spousal maintenance without applying the required statutory factors. Contrary to the statute governing maintenance requests, the district court first considered whether wife qualified for maintenance, and then gave the guideline amount presumptive effect and failed to make sufficient findings in support of its decision. The court thus abused its discretion.

Husband further argued that it was error for the trial court to award wife attorney fees as sanctions. Despite husband’s cursory statement that he complied with disclosures, the record shows that he provided wife with limited financial information, which prompted wife’s motion to compel. In addition, husband did not cooperate in drafting the Trial Management Certificate, which resulted in needlessly incurred expenses. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing this sanction against husband.

Lastly, husband contended that the permanent orders must be reversed because the district court’s bias and prejudice against men and his religion were evident in its rulings. When read in the context of the evidence presented, the comments about husband’s church do not reflect a bias or prejudice about husband’s gender or religion but instead reflect the court’s opinion, based on the evidence, that husband made poor decisions to withhold money, parenting time, and proper living quarters from the child because he was upset with mother. The comments did not rise to the level of unreasonable or unfair bias against husband.

The portion of the judgment regarding maintenance was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed.

The Denver Department of Human Services (the Department) removed the children shortly after their births because mother was using controlled substances. A year later the Department returned the children to mother and closed the case. The Department later initiated this case due to mother’s possible methamphetamine use and reported domestic violence and abuse. The children’s guardian ad litem moved to terminate the parents’ parental rights, and the Department opposed the motion. After a 12-day hearing, the juvenile court terminated both parents’ parental rights.

On appeal, the parents asserted that the juvenile court erred by not making findings to support termination of their parental rights. To terminate parental rights, a juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a child was adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent didn’t comply with a court-approved treatment plan or the plan wasn’t successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Here, the evidentiary facts found by the juvenile court were clearly erroneous and do not support a conclusion that the parents were unfit. The need for permanency alone wasn’t sufficient to terminate parental rights.

The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.  

In January 2018, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning two of B.B.’s biological children and a third child, M.B., as to whom B.B. was the “presumed father.” The Department later amended the petition to name J.G. as M.B.’s alleged biological father. In June 2018, based on genetic testing results, the court adjudicated J.G. as M.B.’s biological father. In March 2019, the juvenile court found that J.G. was M.B.’s legal father and excused B.B.’s counsel from the hearing. Neither mother nor B.B. appeared at the hearing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals declined to review B.B.’s unpreserved due process and equal protection contentions because B.B.’s due process argument did not implicate a miscarriage of justice and the record is inadequate to address equal protection as applied.

B.B. argued that the court erred by finding that J.G. is M.B.’s legal father. He contended that the court violated the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) by failing to hold a timely paternity determination hearing. The UPA requires an informal hearing to be held “[a]s soon as practicable after an action to declare the existence or nonexistence of the father-child relationship has been brought” if the court determines that holding a hearing is “in the child’s best interest.” Even assuming that the “as soon as practicable” requirement applies in a dependency and neglect proceeding, the UPA’s mandate applies only after an action is brought to declare the existence or nonexistence of the father-child relationship, and a dependency and neglect proceeding is not such an action. Further, the juvenile court timely held a paternity hearing and the record supports the finding that J.G. was M.B.’s legal father. The court acted within its discretion in finding that J.G. is M.B.’s biological father.

 The order was affirmed.