Colorado Court of Appeals Opinions

April 30, 2020

2020 COA 74 No. 18CA0245, Morrison Tr. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs

The Sandra K. Morrison Trust (the Trust) owns two adjoining parcels of land: the subject parcel, and the residential parcel, on which the Trust owns a half-duplex. The residential parcel was taxed as residential land, while the subject parcel was taxed at a higher rate as vacant land. The Trust sought reclassification of the subject parcel from vacant to residential land, retroactive for two tax years. The Board of County Commissioners of Eagle County (BCC) affirmed the county assessor’s classification of the subject parcel as vacant land. The Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) found that the subject parcel was not “used as a unit in conjunction with the residential improvements” on the residential parcel and upheld the BCC’s classification.

On appeal, the Trust argued that the BAA erred in failing to reclassify the subject parcel as residential for property tax purposes. For an undeveloped parcel to be classified as residential land in a situation involving multiple parcels, it must be (1) contiguous with residential land; (2) used as a unit with residential land; and (3) under common ownership with residential land. Additionally, the undeveloped parcel must not be used for nonresidential purposes such as commercial or agricultural use. Further, the plain language of CRS § 39-1-102(14.4)(a) does not require each parcel of land in a multi-parcel assemblage to contain a residential improvement. Finally, only the current use should be analyzed, not whether the parcels will likely be sold separately in the future. Here, the BAA applied the incorrect test for “used as a unit.” It thus erred in rejecting the Trust’s petition for reclassification of the subject parcel.

            The BAA’s denial of the Trust’s petition was reversed. The case was remanded to the BAA for a redetermination of whether the subject parcel should be reclassified as residential land using the correct analysis of “used as a unit.”

 

Read More..

2020 COA 75 No. 19CA0155, May v. Petersen

During a morning school drop-off, May exited his child’s school and was navigating his wheelchair down the sidewalk toward the roadway so he could cross at the crosswalk and return to his car. Petersen was the first vehicle in the school drop off lane, situated just inside the crosswalk. Petersen dropped off her child and looked but did not see anyone in the crosswalk. As she moved her vehicle forward, it collided with May’s wheelchair, causing him to suffer a head injury.        Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Petersen had not been negligent and the accident was more likely than not caused by May’s negligence. The court entered judgment in favor of Petersen.

            On appeal, May argued that under CRS §§ 42-4-807 and -808, Petersen was negligent as a matter of law for failing to yield the right-of-way to him. In cases involving vehicle and wheelchair collisions, questions of negligence and liability depend on the circumstances and usually must be resolved by the finder of fact. Here, competent evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings on negligence. Therefore, CRS §§ 42-4-807 and -808 didn’t require entry of judgment as a matter of law for May.

            May also argued that the trial court applied the term “crosswalk” too restrictively, to include only the path in the roadway and not the handicap ramp. He contended that if the court had properly interpreted “crosswalk” to include the handicap ramp, it necessarily would have found that he was in the crosswalk when Petersen started to move, and thus he had the right of way and Petersen was at fault for the accident. However, a crosswalk for purposes of CRS § 42-4-802(1) doesn’t include a handicap ramp, so the trial court didn’t err in its interpretation and application of the term.

            May further contended that the trial court erred in applying an ordinary standard of care to his actions rather than modifying the standard to reflect his wheelchair-using status. Here, the trial court properly assessed all of the relevant circumstances, including May’s disability status, in assessing his actions.

            The judgment was affirmed.

Read More..

April 30, 2020

Read More..