Defendant was convicted of second degree assault with a deadly weapon. At sentencing, the trial court reserved a determination of restitution for 90 days. Ninety-four days after the order of conviction, the prosecution moved for an extension of time to request restitution. The trial court granted the motion. After a hearing, the trial court ordered restitution of $17,060 to be paid to the Crime Victim Compensation Board (CVCB) and $2,546 to be paid to the victim for lost wages.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by ordering restitution more than 91 days after sentencing absent a showing of good cause. The 91-day provisions in CRS § 18-1.3-603 do not establish a deadline by which the trial court must enter an order for restitution. Rather, the period refers to the time within which the prosecution must provide restitution information to the trial court. Thus, the trial court had the authority to enter a restitution order.

Defendant also argued that the trial court failed to find extenuating circumstances for granting the prosecution additional time to provide the information necessary to determine restitution. When a trial court’s initial sentencing order defers determination of restitution, the statute requires the prosecuting attorney to determine the restitution within 91 days, unless the court finds that extenuating circumstances affect the prosecutor’s ability to determine restitution. Here, while the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion for an extension of time to request restitution, it erred by not finding that extenuating circumstances existed.

Defendant also argued that the trial court erred by relying on, but not fully disclosing, otherwise confidential CVCB records in determining proximate cause for the purpose of restitution because this violated the statute in effect at the time and his right to due process. The statute in effect at the time did not require the trial court to disclose otherwise privileged information to the defendant in violation of the victim’s privilege rights. Here, the court stated in its order that it provided defense counsel with all nonprivileged information from the CVCB’s records. Further, defendant’s right to due process does not override the victim’s physician-patient privilege. Therefore, the trial court committed no error by declining to disclose the privileged records.

The restitution order was vacated and the case was remanded for a determination of whether there were extenuating circumstances warranting an extension of the prosecutor’s deadline for submitting restitution information to the court.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Colorado Secretary of State Elections Division alleging a campaign finance violation. The Elections Division dismissed the complaint because it was filed outside the 91-day statute of limitations.

Petitioner appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. However, the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may seek appellate review in the district court unless direct appeal to the Court of Appeals is specifically authorized. Here, no authority exists for direct review of petitioner’s appeal in the Court. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed.

French was admitted to Centura Health Corporation and Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado, d/b/a St. Anthony North Health Campus (the Hospital) for elective spinal fusion surgery. The Hospital considered French an out-of-network patient. Before the surgery, French received a cost estimate stating the surgery would cost $57,601.77 and that after her insurance payment she would be responsible for $1,336.90. French also signed a hospital services agreement (HSA) three separate times before surgery. The HSA stated that reimbursement or payment from an insurance company is not guaranteed, and French would pay any Hospital charges not otherwise paid by insurance.

French’s surgery had complications and she was billed $303,709.48. French paid $1,000 and her insurance paid $73,597.35, leaving a balance of $229,112.13. After several failed attempts to collect the balance from French, the Hospital sued her for breach of contract to recover the unpaid bill. The trial court denied the Hospital’s motion for a declaratory judgment asking the court to hold that the HSA’s price term “all charges” unambiguously referred to the Hospital’s chargemaster rates, which is a computer billing system with predetermined rates for specified medical services. A jury found French breached the HSA by failing to pay. Because the trial court had previously held that the term “all charges” was ambiguous, the jury was asked to interpret the term. The jury concluded “all charges” meant the “reasonable value of the goods and services” provided, and it found that French owed the Hospital $766.74.

On appeal, the Hospital argued that the trial court erred by ruling that the term “all charges” in the HSA was ambiguous, thereby allowing the jury to interpret the term and impose a reasonableness requirement. The Court of Appeals analyzed relevant decisions from other jurisdictions and concluded that the HSA’s price term “all charges” unambiguously referred to the Hospital’s chargemaster rates and was sufficiently definite to be enforceable. Accordingly, the trial court erred.

The trial court’s judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

The Logan County Department of Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding twin children. Mother reported that she did not have Indian heritage, but the children’s father indicated he had “Chickasaw” heritage. The Department sent notice to the Chickasaw Nation (the Nation), which responded by indicating that father and the children were eligible for citizenship through the lineage of the paternal grandfather, who was an enrolled citizen, and that once enrolled, the children would qualify as “Indian Children.” The Nation’s letter also requested the children’s enrollment as Nation members, attached forms for enrollment and tribal citizenship, and requested assistance in completing these forms from the children’s parents or legal guardian. At all relevant times the Department was the children’s legal guardian.

The Department did not notify the juvenile court of the Nation’s reply and request for enrollment. It then moved to terminate the parents’ rights and asserted, as to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), that mother had no Indian heritage and the Nation had responded that the children were not Indian children under the ICWA until the father or the children enrolled. The Department attached the Nation’s response and the enrollment forms to the motion. Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights and found that the ICWA was inapplicable.

On appeal, mother asserted that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded because the Department failed to take steps to enroll the children as requested by the Nation. In a dependency and neglect proceeding, when a notified tribe communicates the desire to obtain citizenship for enrollment-eligible children, the department must, at the earliest time possible, deposit the response with the juvenile court. The court must then hold an enrollment hearing and determine whether it is in the children’s best interests to be enrolled in the requesting tribe. By failing to timely deposit with the juvenile court the Nation’s response indicating its desire to enroll the children, the Department did not comply with its notice responsibilities under the ICWA, and in turn, the juvenile court has had no opportunity to determine whether enrollment in the Nation is in the children’s best interests.

The judgment was vacated and the case was remanded with directions.