The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations period within which the Colorado Department of Revenue (the Department) may invalidate a conservation easement (CE) tax credit begins when the CE donor first claims the CE tax credit.

In this case, the transferees of a portion of CE tax credit claimed the credit before the donor/transferor did. The Department later disallowed the credit in its entirety. The transferees argued that the statute of limitations period began when they claimed the credit and that the Department disallowed the credit too late. The Department asserted, in accordance with its regulation, that the period began when the donor/transferor claimed the credit and that the disallowance occurred before the period expired.

CRS § 39-22-522(7)(i) states that the CE donor shall “represent[] and bind[] the transferees with respect to . . . the statute of limitations.” Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that the statute of limitations period begins only when the CE donor first claims the CE tax credit. Thus, the limitations period here had not expired when the Department disallowed the claimed credit. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether a Colorado State Patrol trooper made a reasonable mistake of law when the trooper stopped a car for making what he believed to be an illegal lane change after witnessing the driver flash her turn signal twice over a distance of less than 200 feet and then change lanes. The Court held that the trooper’s erroneous interpretation of the governing statute, CRS § 42-4-903, did not constitute an objectively reasonable mistake of law. It is plain from the text of the statute that a driver is not required to signal continuously for any set distance before changing lanes on a highway; the statute only requires that a driver use a signal before changing lanes. Thus, because this was not a reasonable mistake of law, the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s suppression order.

This case required the Court to decide whether, in accordance with the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act (the Act), CRS § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I), the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (the Commission) properly declined to engage in rulemaking to consider a rule proposed by respondents.

Respondents proposed a rule that, among other things, would have precluded the Commission from issuing any permits for the drilling of an oil and gas well “unless the best available science demonstrates, and an independent, third-party organization confirms, that drilling can occur in a manner that does not cumulatively, with other actions, impair Colorado’s atmosphere, water, wildlife, and land resources, does not adversely impact human health, and does not contribute to climate change.”

After soliciting and receiving public comment and allowing interested parties to be heard, the Commission declined to engage in rulemaking to consider this proposed rule because, among other things, (1) the rule would have required the Commission to readjust the balance purportedly crafted by the General Assembly under the Act and conditioned new oil and gas drilling on a finding of no cumulative adverse impacts, both of which the Commission believed to be beyond its statutory authority, and (2) the Commission was already working with the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) to address the concerns to which the rule was directed and other Commission priorities took precedence over the proposed rulemaking at this time. The Denver District Court upheld the Commission’s decision, but in a split, published decision, a division of the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order in Martinez v. Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 2017 COA 37, __ P.3d __.

The Supreme Court reversed the division’s judgment and concluded that the Commission properly declined to engage in rulemaking to consider respondents’ proposed rule. The Court reached this conclusion for three primary reasons. First, a court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision as to whether to engage in rulemaking is limited and highly deferential. Second, the Commission correctly determined that, under the applicable language of the Act, it could not properly adopt the rule proposed by respondents. Specifically, as the Commission recognized, the pertinent provisions do not allow it to condition all new oil and gas development on a finding of no cumulative adverse impacts to public health and the environment. Rather, the provisions make clear that the Commission is required (1) to foster the development of oil and gas resources, protecting and enforcing the rights of owners and producers, and (2) in doing so, to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental impacts to the extent necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare, but only after taking into consideration cost-effectiveness and technical feasibility. Finally, in declining to engage in rulemaking, the Commission reasonably relied on the facts that it was already working with the CDPHE to address the concerns underlying respondents’ proposed rule and that other Commission priorities took precedence at this time.

The Supreme Court reviewed whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the Department) lacked standing to challenge a district court’s temporary custody order placing D.Z.B., a juvenile, in one of its residential facilities pending his delinquency adjudication.

The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erroneously merged the analysis used to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue with the analysis used to determine whether a non-party has standing to appeal to assess whether the Department, a non-party to the district court proceedings, had standing to appeal. As a result, the division required the Department to demonstrate that it (1) suffered an injury in fact to a legally protected interest and (2) was substantially aggrieved by the district court’s order. Because the Department was a non-party to the lower court proceedings, the Court of Appeals should have assessed only whether the Department was substantially aggrieved by the district court’s order. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to apply the correct standard and to consider any outstanding issues.

A dispute arose between a school district and a teachers’ association regarding whether, pursuant to the terms of several collective bargaining agreements, the school district was required to compensate teachers for attending English Learning Acquisition (ELA) training. The trial court found the agreements ambiguous and asked the jury to interpret them. The jury, in turn, returned a verdict for the teachers’ association. The school district appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, albeit on slightly different grounds. The Court acknowledged that the agreements contain a management rights clause, which grants the school district control over all lawful rights and authority not expressly addressed in the agreements. But because the “In-Service Education” provision in the agreements is fairly susceptible to being interpreted as expressly requiring payment for ELA training, the Court cannot conclude that the management rights clause allows the school district to refuse to pay for such training. Therefore, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the pertinent contract provisions are ambiguous and that their interpretation was correctly submitted as a factual issue to the jury.