The People petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing Morehead’s convictions for possession and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, as well as seven gambling-related charges. The Court of Appeals held that the search of defendant’s residence violated the Fourth Amendment. It ordered all the evidence seized from defendant’s residence suppressed and reversed defendant’s convictions. In addition, it mandated that the trial court be barred from considering new arguments for admission of that evidence on retrial.

The Supreme Court held that because the scope and conduct of the suppression hearing are within the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial court on retrial may, except where bound by the ruling of a higher court, determine the appropriateness of entertaining new and different motions, evidence, arguments, or theories for or against suppression of contested evidence.

Because the Court of Appeals erred in restricting the trial court’s discretion to entertain additional evidence or consider additional arguments concerning the seizure of this evidence on retrial, that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed.

Ruybalid committed numerous ethical violations arising out of cases that he either prosecuted or supervised while he was district attorney for the Third Judicial District. He argued that he is entitled to the attorney fees and costs he incurred while defending these allegations.

The Supreme Court concluded that because Ruybalid’s ethical violations were at times committed recklessly or knowingly, his attorney fees and costs were not necessarily incurred in the discharge of his official duties. Therefore, Ruybalid is not entitled to reimbursement for the attorney fees and costs that he incurred in defending the alleged ethical violations.

The Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed on different grounds.

The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to review the trial court’s order denying a request for a protective order during a reverse-transfer hearing.

The Supreme Court concluded that neither the reverse-transfer statute, CRS § 19-2- 517(3), nor common law principles regarding the scope of waiver provides a defendant with the ability to temporarily waive privilege as to information disclosed during a reverse-transfer hearing. The Court also concluded that this result does not impermissibly burden a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Thus, the Court held that if a defendant discloses privileged information in open court during a reverse-transfer hearing, that defendant would waive privilege as to any such information at trial.

The trial court’s order was affirmed and the rule to show cause was discharged.

The Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard of review for condemnation cases and whether a condemnation by a special metropolitan district that satisfies private, contractual obligations while also providing benefits to the public violates the Colorado Constitution and relevant statutes.

The Court held that takings questions present mixed issues of law and fact, with public use being a question of law that is reviewed de novo. As a result, the Court reviewed de novo the taking in question.

The Court further held that takings that essentially benefit the public will survive constitutional scrutiny, even if, at the time of the taking, there is an incidental private benefit. Therefore, the taking here is valid, as the condemned land will be used for various utilities and public rights of way.

The Court concluded further held that the plain language of CRS § 38-1-101(1)(b)(I) only limits the transfer of condemned land to a private entity. Because there is no transfer to a private entity here, that section is inapplicable.