In this habeas corpus appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether a district court may summarily dismiss a petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to include a warrant of commitment, as required by CRS § 13-45-101(1). The Court held that noncompliance with the warrant requirement does not deprive courts of jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. When the petitioner does not supply all the relevant warrants of commitment and the court believes that all the warrants are necessary for fair resolution of the habeas petition, the court should either ask the petitioner to provide the missing information or consider the petition based on the information provided.

To the extent that Butler v. Zavaras, 924 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Colo. 1996), Evans v. District Court, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (Colo. 1977), Garrett v. Knight, 480 P.2d 569, 570–71 (Colo. 1971), and McNamara v. People, 410 P.2d 517, 517–18 (Colo. 1966) hold that noncompliance with the warrant requirement is jurisdictional, deprives the court of authority to act, and requires summary dismissal, the Supreme Court overruled these cases.

Feldman and the law firm Haddon, Morgan & Foreman petitioned for relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 from a probate court order requiring the law firm to provide information to the special administrator concerning its representation of Feldman in a criminal prosecution for the murder of his wife, and to deposit funds held in its client trust account into the court registry. In response to the special administrator’s assertion that Colorado’s “slayer statute” applies to the funds at issue as proceeds of the decedent’s life insurance policy, the probate court determined that if Feldman were later found, in the manner prescribed by the statute, to be the decedent’s killer, he would be ineligible to receive those proceeds. Against that eventuality, the probate court found that compelling the return of the unearned funds in the firm’s client trust account would be the only way to protect the children’s interests, and the court’s equitable powers permitted it to do so.

The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause and concluded that the probate court abused its discretion by issuing its order without weighing the considerations inherent in preliminarily enjoining the law firm from expending further funds in the representation of Feldman. In addition, however, because the slayer statute expressly protects third parties who receive a payment in satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation from being forced to return that payment or from liability for the amount of the payment, the Court determined that no finding of a reasonable likelihood of success in attempting to force the return of the insurance proceeds would have been possible. Given this resolution, the Court further concluded that the disclosures ordered by the probate court would not serve their intended purpose.

The Court therefore made the rule to show cause absolute.

In this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and CRS § 16-12-102(2), the Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s order suppressing evidence arising out of an investigatory stop that led to drug charges being brought against defendant.

The Court considered whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to determine his identity. Because the officer received a report of a domestic disturbance, saw defendant walking away from the location of the reported disturbance immediately thereafter, and saw no one else in the area, the Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to determine his identity. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered an alleged instructional error where the jury instruction at issue tracked the language of the model jury instruction that existed at the time of trial. The Court held that simply following model jury instructions doesn’t avoid plain error. However, the Court concluded that any error regarding the instruction at issue here doesn’t require reversal because defendant failed to show that any error so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of defendant’s convictions.

The Court also held that the force sentence enhancer in CRS § 18-3-402(4)(a), which  elevates sexual assault from a class 4 felony to a class 3 felony, doesn’t require proof of a mens rea.

In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted language in the appraisal provision of an insurance policy requiring each party to “select a[n] . . . impartial appraiser.” It concluded, based on the plain meaning of the word “impartial,” that the policy requires the appraisers to be unbiased, disinterested, and unswayed by personal interest. The appraisers must not favor one side more than another, so they may not advocate for either party.

The Court also considered whether a contingent-cap fee agreement between a party and an appraiser rendered the appraiser partial as a matter of law. The Court held that the agreement in this case did not.

The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over a certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to determine whether there should be an arbitration-specific exception to Colorado’s traditionally defined doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court held that Colorado’s law of equitable estoppel applies in the same manner when a dispute involves an arbitration agreement as it does in other contexts. The Court recognized that under Colorado law, equitable estoppel requires proof of four elements—one of which is detrimental reliance. Thus, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can only assert equitable estoppel against a signatory in an effort to compel arbitration if the nonsignatory can demonstrate each of the elements of equitable estoppel, including detrimental reliance.