By operation of law, the Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed by an equally divided court. See C.A.R. 35(b).

In this case, the Supreme Court first concluded that the crime of identity theft is not a continuing offense. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Allman separately on the eight counts of identity theft. The Court next concluded that none of Allman’s convictions for identity theft or forgery were based on identical evidence, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive sentences on those counts. Finally, the Court held that when a court sentences a defendant for multiple offenses in the same case, it may not impose imprisonment for certain offenses and probation for others.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded with instructions to return the case to the trial court for resentencing.

The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of CRS § 24-21-104, which outlines the funding mechanism for the Colorado Department of State (Department). Under this statute, the Department is directed to charge for its services and then use the collected funds to finance the Department’s activities. The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) contended that the Department’s charges are taxes; thus, the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) applies, and any adjustments to the charges after TABOR’s enactment in 1992 constitute either new taxes, tax rate increases, or tax policy changes directly causing a net revenue gain, all of which require advance voter approval. NFIB asserted that because voters did not approve these adjustments, this funding scheme violates TABOR.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. Based on the record presented, there was no evidence that any post-TABOR adjustment resulted in a new tax, tax rate increase, or tax policy change directly causing a net revenue gain. Consequently, the Court did not address whether the charges authorized by CRS § 24- 21-104 are taxes subject to TABOR.

The Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed, the trial court’s summary judgment was reinstated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the terms “juror” and “case” in Colorado’s jury tampering statute, CRS § 18-8-609(1), which provides that a person commits jury tampering if “with intent to influence a juror’s vote, opinion, decision, or other action in a case,” he or she attempts “directly or indirectly to communicate with a juror other than as a part of the proceedings in the trial of the case.”

The Court concluded that for purposes of the jury tampering statute, a “juror” is defined as set forth in CRS § 18-8-601(1) and therefore includes persons who have been drawn or summoned to attend as prospective jurors. The Court further concluded that the jury tampering statute’s references to “a case” and “the case” make clear that for purposes of that statute, a defendant’s effort to influence a juror must be directed at a specifically identifiable case.

Because the People did not charge defendants with attempting to influence a juror in a specifically identifiable case, the Court affirmed the judgment of the division below, although the Court’s reasoning differed in some respects from that of the division.

Colorado’s child support guidelines include a schedule, codified at CRS § 14-10-115(7)(b), that sets specific presumptive payment amounts based on the number of children and the parties’ combined monthly income. However, the schedule does not include an award amount for every conceivable family income level. Here, the Supreme Court considered how a district court should calculate child support obligations when the parties’ combined monthly income exceeds the uppermost income specified in the schedule. The Court concluded that the plain language of the child support statute provides that the uppermost award identified explicitly in the schedule is the minimum presumptive award for families with higher incomes. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court may, within its discretion, award more than that amount so long as it supports its order with findings made pursuant to CRS § 14-10-115(2)(b).