In this habeas corpus appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether subsection (11)(b) of the parole revocation statute, CRS § 17-2-103, as it existed between August 9, 2017 and August 7, 2018, authorizes a parolee’s confinement for the remainder of his parole period. The Court concluded that it does not. Rather, under subsection (11)(b), the parole board is only authorized to order a parolee confined for up to 90 days. Because the parolee in this case has been confined well beyond the 90 days authorized, the Court held that the district court erred in denying his habeas petition. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case to the district court with directions to grant the writ of habeas corpus, make the writ permanent, and order that the parolee be immediately released to parole.

Absent a specific statute or rule stating otherwise, trial courts are divested of jurisdiction over issues that are material to a perfected appeal. In this case, the Supreme Court applied this rule to father’s motions to modify parenting responsibility orders and first concluded that CRS §§ 14-10-129(1)(a)(I) and -131(2) do not specifically grant trial courts jurisdiction to modify parenting responsibility orders while an appeal of the orders is pending. Next, the Court concluded that father’s motions to modify were material to his appeal. Thus, the Court held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on father’s motions to modify while those orders were on appeal. Accordingly, the Court disapproved of the Court of Appeals’ order.

In this opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed a district court’s judgment affirming a county court’s interpretation and application of CRS § 42-4-1307. The Court concluded that the sentence imposed by the county court when it revoked defendant’s probation for a second time was illegal because it exceeded the statutory maximum amount of jail time. Under CRS § 42-4-1307(7), the Court held that the maximum cumulative amount of jail time a sentencing court may impose for probation violations stemming from a second or subsequent alcohol- or drug-related misdemeanor driving offense is 365 days. Because defendant had served more than 365 days in jail as of the filing of this appeal, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the sentence, resentence him under CRS § 42-4-1307(6) and (7), and correct the mittimus.

In this proceeding brought pursuant to C.A.R. 21, plaintiff challenged the district court’s ruling that she impliedly waived her attorney-client privilege by filing a legal malpractice complaint close to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations and by then contesting defendant’s statute of limitations defense.

The Supreme Court concluded that on the facts presented, plaintiff did not assert a claim or defense that either focused or depended on advice given by her counsel or that placed any privileged communications at issue. Accordingly, the Court further concluded that plaintiff did not impliedly waive her attorney-client privilege in this case.

The court therefore made the rule to show cause absolute.

This original proceeding arose from the Title Board’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to CRS § 1-40-107(1)(c) to consider petitioner’s motion for a second rehearing proceeding regarding Proposed Ballot Initiative 2019–2020 #74 and Proposed Ballot Initiative 2019–2020 #75.

The Supreme Court held that the statement in the statute governing ballot title setting that “[t]he decision of the title board on any motion for rehearing shall be final, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, and no further motion for rehearing may be filed or considered by the title board” means that a proposed initiative is subject to only one rehearing proceeding before the Title Board. The Board correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion for a second rehearing.

Accordingly, the title board’s actions were affirmed.

In this original proceeding, the Supreme Court considered whether the district court was authorized to order defendant to disclose his exhibits before trial. The Court concluded that it was not. Because the district court’s order found no support in Crim. P. 16 and arguably infringed on defendant’s constitutional rights, the Court made the rule absolute.