Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges involving unlawful sexual behavior, but later had one charge dismissed following the successful completion of a deferred judgment. The district court held he was ineligible for removal from the sex offender registry because he had more than one conviction for sexual behavior, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

CRS § 16-22-113(3)(c) of the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) bars an individual who “has more than one conviction” for unlawful sexual behavior from petitioning a court to discontinue the requirement to register as a sex offender. Construing the language of CRS § 16-22-113(3)(c) in the context of SORA as a whole and considering the commonly understood legal effect of a successfully completed deferred judgment, the Supreme Court held that a “conviction” for purposes of the eligibility bar in CRS § 16-22-113(3)(c) does not include a successfully completed deferred judgment.

The judgment was reversed.

In this workers’ compensation case, the Supreme Court considered whether an administrative law judge (ALJ) may place a claimant at maximum medical improvement (MMI) after concluding that an employer or an employer’s insurer has overcome the finding of a Division Independent Medical Examination (DIME) doctor that the claimant hasn’t reached MMI.

The Court held that once an ALJ concludes that an employer or an employer’s insurer has overcome a DIME doctor’s MMI opinion, the ALJ may determine the claimant’s MMI status and permanent impairment rating as questions of fact.

The Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an out-of-custody defendant accused of felony DUI is entitled to a preliminary hearing pursuant to the preliminary hearing statute, CRS § 16-5-301(1)(a), and the related court rule, Crim. P. 7(h)(1).

Under these provisions, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing whenever he or she is charged with a class 4, 5, or 6 felony and the charge requires the imposition of mandatory sentencing. Further, by its plain meaning, “mandatory sentencing” involves any period of incarceration required by law.

Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court held that Huckabay is entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was charged with felony DUI, a class 4 felony that carries mandatory sentencing either to the Colorado Department of Corrections or to a county jail as a condition of probation.

The Court therefore made the rule absolute.