CRS § 19-2-509(4)(b) provides that juveniles who are denied bail “must be tried on the charges on which the bail is denied” within 60 days “after the entry of such order or within sixty days after the juvenile’s entry of a plea.” In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute is ambiguous with regard to the type of right it confers and, consequently, to the remedy for its violation. Because it is ambiguous, the Court considered whether the legislature intended it to be a bail statute, and have violations remedied through immediately holding a bail hearing and ordering the juvenile’s release, or a speedy trial statute, and have violations remedied through dismissal. The Court concluded that § 19-2-509(4)(b) is a bail statute and thus held that the remedy for its violation is for the court to immediately hold a bail hearing and order the juvenile’s release. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed.

In this original proceeding, the Supreme Court considered whether the district court erred in denying defendant’s motion to disqualify defendant’s longtime former counsel from representing plaintiff.

The Court concluded that defendant’s former counsel has a former-client conflict under Colo. RPC 1.9(a) that precludes counsel’s representation of plaintiff in this case. As relevant here, the Court ruled that this matter is “substantially related” to matters in which defendant’s former counsel previously represented defendant. More specifically, the Court determined that the district court misconstrued “a substantially related matter” to mean “the same” matter and then incorrectly found that the information defendant’s former counsel probably possesses as a result of its prior representation of defendant is neither confidential nor advantageous to plaintiff. Because the district court should have disqualified defendant’s former counsel from representing plaintiff in order to preserve the integrity and fairness of these proceedings, the Court made the rule to show cause absolute.