The People sought review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the district court’s order voiding the juvenile magistrate’s ruling. The district court had found that the juvenile magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant J.D.’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, further, that J.D.’s sole remedy for a failure of his counsel to render effective assistance in advising him concerning his deferred adjudication was to file a petition with the court for reinstatement of his review rights nunc pro tunc. By contrast, the Court of Appeals found that the juvenile magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain J.D.’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was a motion in a delinquency case that the magistrate had been appointed to hear, and it was not a motion seeking review of any prior order of the magistrate.

The Supreme Court held that because a juvenile magistrate is not prohibited, either by statute or court rule, from revisiting his or her prior rulings, decrees, or other decisions in a case that the magistrate has been properly appointed to hear, unless and until the proceedings have culminated in a final order or judgment, and because a guilty plea, prior to sentencing and entry of a judgment of conviction, does not constitute a final judgment or order, the district court erred in ruling that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over the juvenile’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed, although on different grounds.

The Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court plainly erred by permitting an expert to testify about a DNA profile developed by a non-testifying analyst. The Court held that any error in allowing the expert to testify about the DNA profile was not plain at the time of trial or the time of appellate review.

The Court also reviewed whether the prosecution constructively amended the habitual offender charge against defendant by mislabeling one of defendant’s prior felony convictions in the charging document. The Court concluded that the prosecution adequately alleged defendant was convicted of a specific felony and proved that prior conviction as alleged. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the mislabeled prior felony resulted in a simple variance that does not require reversal.

The Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded with directions.

In this appeal from a number of water court orders, defendants contended that the water court erred in (1) granting summary judgment for plaintiffs and partial summary judgment for the third-party defendant; (2) imposing civil penalties for defendants’ violations of an administrative order requiring them to cease and desist unlawfully storing state waters in two ponds on their properties; and (3) certifying its summary judgment rulings as final pursuant to CRCP 54(b).

The Supreme Court concluded that the water court properly exercised its discretion in certifying its summary judgment orders pursuant to CRCP 54(b) and thus this appeal was properly before the Court. The Court next concluded that the water court properly granted both plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and the third-party defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment because the summary judgment record established, as a matter of law, that (1) defendants did not comply with the administrative order requiring them to cease and desist the unlawful storage of water in the ponds on their properties, and (2) the third-party defendant did not breach an agreement between it and defendants that defendants claimed satisfied their obligations under the administrative order. Finally, the Court concluded that the water court properly imposed civil penalties under CRS § 37-92-503(6)(a)(II).

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court’s judgment, concluded that both plaintiffs and the third-party defendant are entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees that they incurred in this appeal, and remanded this case to the water court to allow that court to determine the amount of fees to be awarded.

In this case arising from the 2015 mass shooting at a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado Springs, the Supreme Court considered two narrow questions: (1) whether plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the shooter’s conduct was the “predominant cause” of plaintiffs’ injuries such that the facility’s conduct, even if it contributed to such injuries, could not be a substantial factor in causing them; and (2) whether plaintiffs established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the facility’s parent organization owed them a duty of care.

As to the first question, the Court concluded, without expressing any opinion on the merits of this case, that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the shooter’s conduct was the predominant cause of their injuries. Thus, the division below correctly determined that summary judgment was inappropriate on this issue.

As to the second question, the Court concluded, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs did not establish that the facility’s parent organization owed them a legal duty. Accordingly, the division correctly affirmed the entry of summary judgment for the parent organization on this claim.

The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the division below.

The Supreme Court reviewed whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that a restrictive covenant was not a compensable property interest for neighboring landowners in an eminent domain proceeding. In so doing, the Court concluded that its decision in Smith v. Clifton Sanitation District, 300 P.2d 548 (Colo. 1956), was not limited to its particular facts, but instead established a broad rule under which neighboring property owners are not entitled to compensation under the Colorado Constitution when a government entity uses land it acquires in a manner that is violative of a restrictive covenant.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was affirmed.